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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis offers a comprehensive review of the privatization process in Central and East-
ern Europe and its impact on important corporate governance issues, such as ownership 
structures and regulatory systems. The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the 
existing literature on global corporate governance issues. Chapter 2 highlights the main 
elements of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 3 deals explicitly with the 
development of corporate governance and privatization in Bulgaria, Romania and Slove-
nia, and compares the outcomes of the overall transition processes. Chapter 4 illustrates the 
results of my empirical study on the effects of privatization on the ownership structures of 
the 50 largest enterprises in the observed countries. Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes. 
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1 Corporate Governance Worldwide 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
„Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance  
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.”  
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) 
 
This introductory phrase from the abstract of the often-cited paper “A Survey of Corporate 
Governance” written by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny illustrates the quintessence 
of corporate governance. In assuring that the interests of the company’s management and 
its stakeholders, being it shareholders, creditors or other related parties, are aligned, corpo-
rate governance deals with a considerable amount of issues that bear reference to the prin-
cipal-agent problem, resulting from the separation of ownership and control.  
 
The agency theory’s origin traces back at least to Adam Smith (1776) who firstly doubted 
that the managers of a company, owned by other investors, would watch over their capital 
with the same vigilance with which individually liable managers would watch over their 
own. 
 
200 years later his idea had provided the basis for Jensen & Meckling (1976) who intro-
duced the concept of the principal-agent problem to the modern corporation, by explaining 
that complete contracts between the manager and the financier are not feasible, and there-
fore, create significant residual control rights for the managers of a company. These dis-
crepancies in the control rights between the two parties result in the occurrence of agency 
costs, which are defined as “the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the 
bonding costs incurred by the agents and a residual loss” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
publication of this paper has increased the significance of corporate governance considera-
bly, and has produced a new field of research for academics. 
 
The main objectives of corporate governance – aligning the interests of managers and 
owners and thereby reducing agency costs – imply the implementation of a wide range of 
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governance mechanisms. Denis and McConnel (2003) characterize these mechanisms on 
the basis of their internal or external influence on the company.  
 
Internal corporate governance includes issues, such as the size and structure of the board of 
directors, compensation of management and ownership structures. The latter is of primary 
interest in the course of this paper, as the change of ownership is investigated on an em-
pirical basis for the Central and Eastern European countries Bulgaria, Romania and Slove-
nia. 
 
External corporate governance comprises outside control mechanisms, such as mergers and 
acquisitions or the legal system affecting a firm’s governance. Again, the latter mechanism 
is an important issue I deal with in this paper, as ownership changes are often closely re-
lated to legal or regulatory changes, especially in the transition economies I am focusing 
on. 
 
The literature on international corporate governance has observed strong variations in these 
mechanisms across different countries, resulting in a fistful of core corporate governance 
systems. In the next chapter I review the existing literature and illustrate the main differ-
ences in ownership structures and legal or regulatory systems around the world. Further-
more, I explain the link between these two mechanisms and their interrelation with the 
corporate governance system in the very country or region. 
 
1.2 Corporate Ownership around the World 
 
For many years the literature has accepted the image of a modern corporation expressed by 
Berle and Means (1932) who argue that in a modern world ownership and control is sepa-
rated among the financiers and the managers of a company. More recently several studies 
had observed that this may be true for the 200 largest companies in the United States dur-
ing the time when Berle and Means had published their book, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, but in the global scheme of things ownership structures are “far from 
universal” (La Porta et al., 1999). 
 
In fact, ownership concentration is the most prevalent form of equity ownership outside the 
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), where ownership is dispersed among a 
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large number of small individual shareholders. Even in the United States there are a con-
siderable percentage of companies, which are publicly traded, with significant ownership 
concentration (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). 
 
Most of the literature on ownership structures outside the UK and US give attention to 
Germany, Japan and presently Central and Eastern Europe. Franks and Mayer (2001) dem-
onstrate that large German corporations are dominated by powerful blockholders, such as 
other companies or families. Besides, large commercial banks play a significant role 
through the use of proxy votes of individual shareholders and thereby increase their voting 
power in comparison to their equity ownership considerably. Prowse (1992) examines 
ownership structures in Japanese corporations and demonstrates that financial institutions 
hold significant stakes in many companies. In addition, large firms are often part of cross 
shareholdings known as keiretsus. Therefore, the literature often roughly differentiates 
between market-centered economies in the UK and US and bank-centered economies in 
Germany and Japan.  
 
In another study, Franks, Mayer and Wagner (2005) give reason for the unequal develop-
ment of ownership in Germany compared to the United Kingdom. While in Britain compa-
nies used external finance to grow through acquisitions, German corporations preferred to 
invest internally and acquired only partial stakes in other companies. As a result ownership 
concentration remained at a high level. Furthermore, increasing intermediation by financial 
institutions and other corporations had strengthened their positions in German firms con-
siderably, whereas financial intermediation was virtually nonexistent in the UK. 
 
Partial acquisitions and intermediation by financial institutions had led to the emergence of 
corporate pyramids, which until now dominate the picture of corporate ownership in Euro-
pean countries except for the UK. Pyramidal structures, another issue my empirical analy-
sis deals with explicitly, enable controlling shareholders to increase their control rights 
greatly in excess of their cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999). In their quantitative 
analysis of 27 wealthy economies around the globe La Porta et al. give evidence that 26 
percent of the companies controlled by an ultimate owner are part of a pyramidal structure. 
 
Apart from the “big four” there exists a moderate amount of literature on ownership con-
centration in other parts of the world. Otten, Heugens and Schenk (2006) document owner-
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ship concentration as most prevalent in continental Europe, Asia and South- and Central 
America. Xu and Wang (1997) and Valadares and Leal (2000) observe high levels of con-
centration in China and Brazil respectively. 
 
Countries with a high level of ownership concentration usually report a high percentage of 
family ownership. According to Burkhart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) this holds true for 
both, privately held and publicly traded companies. They conclude that “most firms in the 
world are controlled by their founders or by the founders’ families and heirs”.  
 
Apart from family, corporate and bank ownership, state control is one of the principal 
ownership types. Especially in many European countries governments still have large con-
trol and cash flow rights in companies located in the very countries, resulting from post-
war state ownership in Western Europe and the previous planned economy in Eastern 
Europe. Particularly transition economies in Eastern European countries still show a wide 
distribution of state owned companies in many industries (Frydman et al. 1997). State 
ownership is of primary importance in the countries of my empirical analysis, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovenia, and will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.  
 
1.3 Corporate Ownership and Performance 
 
1.3.1 Ownership Structures and Performance 
 
Many research papers have explored the impact of ownership structures and types of own-
ers on indicators, measuring the economic performance of a company, such as asset prices, 
market-to-book values (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), value-to-sales ratios (Lloyd, Hand 
and Modani, 1997), price-to-earnings ratios (Zeckhouser and Pound, 1990) or Tobin’s Q 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Many of these studies, and all of the ones I have men-
tioned above, conclude that ownership concentration is to some extend beneficial to a 
company’s performance. 
 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) demonstrate in a study comprising 435 large European 
companies, that the relationship between ownership concentration and a firm’s market-to-
book value, as well as its asset return, follows a quadratic function, meaning that large 
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shareholders are beneficial, but can be detrimental to a company’s performance above a 
certain level of ownership concentration (see Figure 1): 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of largest owner’s share on a firm’s market-to-book value 
Source: Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
 
 
The authors remark that shareholders with a controlling stake may use their power to en-
force entrenchment, which has negative effects on firm performance.  
 
In an analysis of 309 listed Swedish companies during 1991 and 1997 Cronquist and Nils-
son (2003) find a significant negative effect of controlling vote ownership on company 
value as measured by Tobin’s Q. They show that families in Sweden are more likely to 
entrench their control considerably via dual-class shares and other control mechanisms, 
and therefore, increase agency costs significantly. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) indicate 
that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability across countries 
differs. Whereas they find a negative influence of diversification on company performance 
in the United States and a positive in the United Kingdom, no significant relationship in 
France, Germany or Canada has been determined. Bergh (1995) finds that ownership con-
centration is positively related to economic efficiency, signifying that companies with large 
shareholders are more likely to undertake strategic and cooperative synergies, and thus, 
achieve competitive advantages. Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) note that ownership 
concentration may be beneficial to company performance ex post, but creates ex ante 
threats of expropriation. These threats have adverse effects on managerial performance, 
such as a reduction of the effectiveness of incentive schemes, based on company perform-
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ance, because of stronger monitoring. On the other hand, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
remark that large owners have stronger control rights to monitor managers, and therefore, 
align the interests of the firm’s managers and its shareholders. 
 
Generally, the literature agrees that large shareholders are increasing corporate perform-
ance up to a certain point.  
 
1.3.2 Ownership Types and Performance 
 
Apart from studies on the relationship between ownership concentration and company per-
formance, scientists have been measuring the influence of certain types of owners on a 
firm’s profitability. 
 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) believe that the statement - owners always strive for maxi-
mizing a company’s economic profit - cannot be generalized, as many types of owners, 
such as institutional investors, banks or other corporations sometimes have an intermediary 
function for the final owners, probably the ultimate owners within a pyramidal ownership 
structure. Hence, a company’s performance depends significantly on preferences set by the 
firm’s controlling parties. Although the controlling owners of a corporation may behave in 
a utility maximizing manner, their utility depends on other factors as well, apart from in-
creasing economic profit or shareholder value. Such other goals are for instance ensuring 
constant liquidity, reputation building, transferring knowledge or political goals. In their 
study Thomsen and Pedersen find that companies with institutional investors as owners are 
relatively large in size and characterized by higher dividend payments and low cost of 
capital. 
 
According to their findings, Thomsen and Pedersen conclude that larger firms need to dis-
perse their ownership structure and pay out a large share of their profits in order to attract 
new financiers, and to grow more extensively in size. Besides, large companies tend to 
have an advantage in raising additional funds via the stock exchange, and therefore, reduce 
their cost of capital considerably by lowering their debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
Generally, financial institutions have a positive influence on a company’s market-to-book 
value in comparison to corporate, family or government ownership, as the latter, and espe-
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cially the last ownership type, are seen to have other goals apart from economic perform-
ance. Pound (1992) supports this finding by stating that specialized investment companies 
with large stakes in corporations improve firm performance significantly. Amihud and Lev 
(1999) indicate that institutional investors reduce agency costs resulting from the separa-
tion of ownership and control. 
 
By measuring the impact of ownership types on the return on assets (ROA), Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) find relatively similar results as for market-to-book values. In contrast, 
corporate and family ownership lead to a stronger incentive to grow internally as measured 
by sales growth. This indicates that the type of a firm’s controlling owner has a significant 
influence on the strategy of the very company (profit versus growth objectives). Whereas 
institutional owners diversify their portfolios including the companies they provide capital 
with, and therefore, prefer shareholder value and regular returns on their stake in form of 
dividends, families and also other companies have more long-term objectives and value 
growth, liquidity and a stable development of economic performance. 
  
Governments tend to favor social welfare by providing employment to the public. There-
fore, economic performance sometimes is just secondary in a government-owned com-
pany’s corporate strategy. This implies that government-owned companies perform worse 
in comparison to their private counterparts, since non-profit-maximizing behaviour is par-
ticularly common in those company types. Generally, the literature gives evidence that 
private ownership is associated with better company performance than state ownership 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). In the chapter “Privatization in Central and Eastern 
Europe” I compare state and private ownership with each other. Since the countries of my 
empirical study are currently within the final stage of a transition process from state to pri-
vate ownership, I pay particular attention to this issue in a separate chapter. 
 
With the introduction of executive stock options in many large corporations, the emer-
gence of leveraged buyouts by managers, and Eastern European privatizations to insiders, 
such as workers, employees or managers, employee stock ownership has become an impor-
tant ownership type. Djankov and Murrel (2002) differentiate between non-managerial and 
managerial employees within this ownership category. Kang and Sorensen (1999) believe 
that companies nowadays are more dependent on highly skilled professionals who receive 
ownership stakes in the very company as a form of managerial incentive. Blasi, Conte and 
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Kruse (1996) find a positive relationship between this form of managerial compensation 
and economic performance. Amihud and Lev (1999) remark, that performance-based com-
pensation, such as executive stock options, aligns the interests of managers and stockhold-
ers and reduces overall risk aversion of the managers to undertake more profitable projects.  
 
Regarding worker ownership or, in other words, non-managerial ownership, the literature 
is generally not congruent. Whereas Frydman et al. (1997) and Djankov and Murrel (2002) 
associate worker ownership with worse performance than with other types of insider own-
ership, Jones (1993) reports a positive relationship between a company’s profitability and 
increased participation of workers or employees in control and/or economic profits. 
 
1.3.3 Are Certain Ownership Structures Better than Others? 
 
Different ownership structures and types of ultimate owners have both, advantages and 
disadvantages. There is not “the right” way how corporations should be organized. This 
conclusion dates back to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) who point out that “the best way to 
organize depends on the nature of the environment to which the organization relates”. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) corroborate this hypothesis by arguing that in the long run a 
company which is able to overcome market pressures, especially from heavy competition, 
will develop an ownership structure that is close to optimal for the very company. This 
implies that ownership structures and generally, corporate governance systems vary greatly 
across countries. 
 
In a quantitative analysis comprising twelve European countries, Thomsen and Pedersen 
(1997) measure that 66 percent of the variance in corporate ownership (as measured by R-
squared in a multi-nominal logistic regression) are explained by the four factors stock mar-
ket size, banking concentration, frequency of dual class shares and openness of the econ-
omy. While the presence of large banks and the implementation of dual class shares sup-
port dominant minority ownership, especially family ownership, the size of the stock mar-
ket and the openness of the economy towards foreign investors have negative effects on the 
distribution of dominant minority shareholders. 
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Apart from these factors, one major component of a company’s business environment is 
the firm’s regulatory surroundings it is operating in. The next chapter deals with laws and 
regulations and its effects on corporate governance explicitly. 
 
1.4 Legal Systems and Corporate Governance and its Relationship with 
Corporate Ownership 
 
A well functioning corporate governance system would not be working without a devel-
oped regulatory system providing a legal framework for companies operating in the very 
region. Therefore, corporate governance issues, such as the composition of the board of 
directors, executive compensation or ownership structures, are strongly related to a com-
pany’s regulatory or legal environment. 
 
In previous chapters I have already discussed that corporate governance mechanisms vary 
considerably across countries. Therefore, it is obvious that laws enacted by the govern-
ments with regard to corporate governance differ significantly from one country to another. 
 
In Law and Finance (1998) La Porta et al. analyze investor protection by law in 49 differ-
ent countries with publicly traded companies on the basis of variables that are related to 
shareholder and creditor rights. They categorize the countries in their study according to 
the four general groups: common-law countries, French-civil-law countries, German-civil-
law countries and Scandinavian-civil-law countries. The authors find that legal protection 
to shareholders is statistically different in countries with respect to the origin of law. They 
conclude that, generally speaking, investors in common-law countries, such as the US or 
the UK, have the strongest rights with respect to shareholder protection. 
 
But it is not only the laws on the books that determine investor protection. It is also the 
quality of enforcement by the judicial system that affects the efficiency of a country’s cor-
porate governance system. La Porta et al. (1998) show, that the quality of law enforcement 
is the highest in Scandinavian countries, followed by German civil-law countries and 
common-law countries. French-civil-law countries are lagging behind in both, the quality 
of the laws on the books and their enforcement. 
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So how do these differences in quality of a country’s regulatory system influence owner-
ship structures? La Porta et al. (1998) show that to some extend, ownership concentration 
is a substitute for poor shareholder protection. In their study they document a higher level 
of ownership concentration in French civil-law countries, those that were characterized as 
the countries with the lowest quality of investor protection. The authors conclude that in 
countries with poor investor protection shareholders might need larger stakes in companies 
to monitor the managers, and therefore, avoid expropriation enforced by the management. 
Furthermore, weak investor protection impedes a company to attract minority shareholders, 
which automatically leads to higher ownership concentration. Another study carried out by 
the same authors (La Porta et al., 1997) provides evidence that higher investor protection 
supports the development of financial markets, as shareholders accept lower rates of return 
and, as a consequence, companies are more likely to use external sources to finance their 
operations. 
 
Generally, the literature agrees with the findings of La Porta et al. that an efficient regula-
tory system is an important corporate governance mechanism and helps to align the inter-
ests of managers and shareholders within a corporation. 
 
Kang and Sorensen (1999) describe the regulatory system as the “foundation of modern 
corporate governance”, because it is protecting investors in order to exercise and transfer 
control rights, such as the right to claim a dividend payment, the right to vote or the right to 
inspect corporate books to obtain necessary information. Managers in countries with low 
shareholder protection hold up to twice as much excess cash in comparison to corporations 
in countries with good legal protection (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003), which 
supports the statement that companies in common-law countries tend to pay out a higher 
fraction of profits in form of dividends than firms in countries with weaker protection stan-
dards, after controlling for firm reinvestment opportunities (La Porta et al., 2000). 
  
If investor protection standards are the highest in common-law countries, such as the US or 
the UK, and these improve corporate governance systems and support the development of 
financial markets, why we do not see a convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon system of 
corporate governance in other countries? Ottens, Heugens and Schenk (2006) explain that 
although there are “global ideals” of corporate governance systems, including greatly de-
veloped financial markets like in the US with the possibilities to generate huge financial 
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returns, no one is in every respect superior to all others. The economies in Western Euro-
pean and South-East Asian countries are prospering too, indicating that there is no absolute 
need for adopting an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system. Surely corporate govern-
ance reforms will be introduced to adopt some regulations from “global ideals” to reach or 
maintain financial effectiveness, but this will happen in an adequate manner in order not to 
destroy local privileges and corporate governance traditions. Therefore, policy makers tend 
to develop their own corporate governance reforms in order to achieve “social peace”.  
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2 Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
2.1 Incentives, Goals and History of Privatization 
 
The term privatization refers to the transition of ownership of assets formerly owned by the 
state into the hands of private entities. Privatization is a phenomenon that is relatively new 
in the fields of economic history. To describe the purpose and the objectives of privatiza-
tion, it is recommendable to give a brief introduction on the history of the emergence and 
the development of this important economic process. 
 
Milton Friedman, one of the most influential economists in history, advocates in his book 
Capitalism and Freedom (1962) the lowering of the role of the government in free markets 
in order to create political and social freedom. Thus, privatization is one way to use these 
free markets to allocate resources efficiently within an economy, and to respond to failings 
of state ownership (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Indeed at the time, when Friedman’s 
book had been published, the degree of state ownership was tremendously high, as a con-
sequence of nationalization processes implemented by the governments to stabilize and 
regulate national economies after World War II, the Great Depression and the downfall of 
the colonial empires. During that period governments around the world were of the opinion 
that the state should at least control the core industries, such as telecommunications, elec-
tricity, non-road transportation, postal services and to some degree monetary services to 
provide economic stability to the public. 
 
The first steps towards a large-scale privatization program were taken by Konrad Ade-
nauer, first Chancellor of West Germany, who enforced the partial privatization of two 
large companies, Volkswagen and Preussag, in 1961. Due to an economic downturn that 
followed afterwards, further privatization measures disappeared in government drawers, 
and as a result, many small shareholders had to be bailed out. 
 
Therefore, the first modern privatization program was introduced by Margaret Thatcher, 
former prime minister of the United Kingdom, in the early 1980s. After her victory for the 
conservative party in the prime elections on 4 May 1979, large companies in major indus-
tries, such as British Petroleum, British Telecom or British Airways, were privatized under 
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the so called “Thatcherism”. The main goals of large-scale privatization programs set by 
the Thatcher government include raising revenues to finance possible budget deficits, pro-
moting economic efficiency, providing opportunities to foster competition, reducing gov-
ernment interference within the economy and developing national capital markets (Price 
Waterhouse, 1989a,b). 
 
Hinds and Pohl (1991) describe the state as an intermediary party which is actually owned 
by the population. Hence, the authors come to the conclusion that the population is the 
ultimate owner of all assets owned by the state, and the overall objective of privatization is 
therefore the elimination of the state as an intermediary by assigning responsibilities di-
rectly to individuals. The disadvantages of state intermediation will be discussed in a fur-
ther chapter “Privatization Effects on Corporate Performance”, where I compare state 
owned with privately owned companies. 
 
During the 1990s many other countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia have adopted 
the policy towards “denationalization” and introduced large privatization programs. Within 
eleven years the revenues for the governments involved in privatization processes have 
increased more than threefold from nearly 40 to 140 billion USD (see figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Annual privatization revenues for Governments, 1988 - 1999 in billion USD 
Source: Megginson and Netter (2001) 
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The last regions to implement large-scale privatizations in order to create efficient market 
economies include the former Soviet-bloc nations and Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. Due to the special focus of this paper on those countries, I deal with them explicitly 
in the separate chapter “Privatization in Transition Economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe”. 
 
2.2 Privatization Methods 
 
In the past decades privatization has taken place in a variety of different forms. In a paper 
focusing on transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Brada (1996) gives a rea-
sonable classification of privatization methods. One way to divest state-owned assets is 
privatization through restitution of property that has formerly been expropriated by the 
state from the assets’ initial owners. This form of privatization was very common for agri-
cultural land and real estate in Eastern European countries during the 1990s. However, 
privatization through restitution is associated with difficulties in determining the legitimate 
owner of the formerly expropriated asset. 
 
Furthermore, assets are privatized through a direct sales process to individuals, corpora-
tions or groups of domestic or foreign investors. After the reunification of East and West 
Germany the government used this method to privatize many large companies via so called 
“Treuhandanstalten”. These institutions had been in charge of settling the privatization 
process as quickly as possible, and supporting the companies in order to become competi-
tive within the first years after privatization. Another way of selling ownership stakes to 
other parties is through a public share offering, similar to initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
the private sector. This method enables the government to attract a greater number of po-
tential investors and simultaneously promotes the development of capital markets. 
 
The third category is mass or voucher privatization, which entitles citizens to receive 
shares in state-owned companies through the purchase or free receipt of vouchers. Gov-
ernments in Eastern European countries, particularly in the Czech Republic, introduced 
voucher privatization extensively to transform public ownership of corporations into pri-
vate hands rapidly. Voucher programs were carried out in several tranches, including a 
limited amount of assets. The strengths of voucher privatizations are the fast process of 
transition and a relatively strong transparency (Brada, 1996). However, Hinds and Pohl 
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(1991) find that distribution through vouchers may lead people to make the wrong deci-
sions regarding where to invest as a result of a lack of information. Insiders will therefore 
benefit considerably thanks to an information advantage. 
 
The last method, privatization from below, is not a real transition process, but rather a re-
sult of the emergence of a free market. This category comprises the start-ups of new busi-
nesses, which have a considerable share in the development of the private sector. 
 
The methods specified above are complementary paths to enforce large-scale privatization 
and many governments have used a combination of them to promote a free market econ-
omy. Megginson et al. (2004) examine in a comprehensive study comprising 1,992 privati-
zations that the choice of an adequate privatization program depends on several factors, 
such as the nature of the capital market, political and firm-specific factors. Governments 
are more likely to carry out public share offerings if capital markets are less developed, 
which implies that governments thereby try to boost stock market liquidity and capacity. 
Furthermore, there are considerably more share issue privatizations (SIPs) in countries 
with a relatively equal distribution of income, since more potential investors are to be at-
tracted and willing to pay a price which is not extensively under the fair value of the enter-
prise. Generally, governments prefer to privatize profitable firms as they seek acceptance 
among the population for their privatization program. 
  
When government interventions are relatively seldom, meaning that potential investors 
have good perspectives to maintain full control over a corporation, investors are more ac-
tive in enforcing direct asset sales. 
 
Finally, privatization by means of SIPs is more likely to occur in bull markets than in bear 
markets. Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalo (2001) give evidence that the choice of the priva-
tization method depends significantly on the budgetary situation of the government. The 
greater the government’s deficit the higher the likelihood that it will privatize by means of 
public offerings. 
 
Apart from decisions on the right privatization method, governments have to consider the 
optimal timing and pace of the transition process. Generally, the literature disagrees about 
whether restructuring measures should be performed before the actual privatization process 
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by the government, or passed on to the prospective private owner. Hinds and Pohl (1991) 
argue that governments should carry out restructuring methods that do not require major 
investments in order to attract a greater number of potential buyers. Such measures are for 
instance the elimination of labor and financial problems, which discourages interested par-
ties. More capital-intense investments regarding the restructuring of a corporation should 
be left to the private sector. Nellis and Kikeri (1989) support this statement by explaining 
that governments are better capable of undertaking labor restructuring by using pensions or 
unemployment payments. In a study comprising 236 Mexican companies Lopez-de-Silanes 
(1997) finds no significant increase in the prices paid for privatized companies, which have 
been part of a major restructuring process. Rather restructuring bears substantial costs that 
are not compensated by higher premiums. He therefore recommends that governments 
should sell companies immediately without major restructuring measures. 
 
Apart from decisions on the restructuring process of privatized firms, another related prac-
tical question is whether the state should sell enterprises all at once, in stages or retain a 
controlling stake in the company, even after partially privatizing the firm. Hellwig (2006) 
argues that partial privatizations generate further conflicts of interest, as the state is respon-
sible for regulating access for other market players to foster competition, whereas it is in-
terested in cashing in on the profits of the undertaking. Such blocking stakes are relatively 
common in private industries in many European Countries, such as France and Germany. 
George and Prabhu (2000) find that companies are less likely to carry out restructuring 
after privatization if the government retains dominant interests, as it depends on employees 
and unions in order to assure political support. According to a study of Boardman and Vin-
ing (1989), partially privatized companies do not perform better and often worse than fully 
privatized or even state owned corporations. However, Frydman et al. (1997) show in a 
study containing a large sample of mid-sized companies in Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Poland, that partial privatization does not result in worse performance of privatized 
companies, than in the case of fully divested corporations. 
 
2.3 Privatization Effects on Corporate Performance 
 
There exists a vast amount of literature which deals with privatization effects on corporate 
performance. Due to the wide spectrum of my work I can not depict every scientific paper 
within this field. I have tried, however, to review an adequate number of papers that will 
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provide a representative view of the core findings of important scholars, dealing with pri-
vatization and firm performance. 
 
Privatizing a corporation results in a major change in a company’s ownership structure and 
consequently has a considerable impact on corporate performance. Therefore, privatization 
provides an interesting setting to evaluate the effects of ownership on firm performance 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003).  
 
Many studies provide evidence that public firms are lagging behind in terms of corporate 
efficiency. One key explanation for this economic deficit is the statement that public com-
panies are more likely to address the objectives of politicians rather than care about maxi-
mizing efficiency (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Thus, excess labor spending is 
another characteristic of many companies before they are privatized, since politicians focus 
on securing jobs and minimizing unemployment rates to gain acceptance among voters. 
 
Furthermore, residual claims on state-owned enterprises are confusing and unclear, result-
ing from highly dispersed ownership (actually the ultimate owners are the taxpayers) and 
weak incentives to increase efficiency. Hinds and Pohl (1991) remark, that ownership by 
all is equal to ownership by nobody. Aligning the interests of a public company’s manag-
ers and its owners (the nation’s citizens) is therefore difficult to implement, since citizens 
are less able to monitor the management than in the case of private ownership (Shleifer, 
1998). 
 
Finally, public firms have fewer difficulties in raising additional capital, since the govern-
ment is responsible for funding and enjoys nearly unlimited opportunities to access exter-
nal finance. This results in “soft” budget constraints, since bankruptcy is basically unlikely 
to occur. The threat of financial distress, private companies are facing, is practically non-
existent, and results in greater inefficiency of public enterprises (Frydman et al., 2000). 
 
2.3.1 Explanations for the Variance in Post-Privatization Performance 
 
On average privatization results in an improvement of corporate efficiency and increases a 
firm’s profitability. This is a very general statement, since in reality privatization effects 
vary considerably across different types of privatization. One important question is which 
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type of owner improves efficiency the most after privatization. Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1996) argue that restructuring is less likely to occur when the objectives of the 
new owners are close to those of politicians. They state that in many countries insiders, 
such as managers or other types of employees, receive considerable control rights even 
before privatization. These types of owners typically have similar objectives to those of 
politicians, such as job security. Especially employees are even more concerned about em-
ployment and support excess labor spending. As a consequence, restructuring in order to 
improve efficiency occurs only to a limited extend. 
 
Managers as owners show a tendency towards empire building, and thus, are more con-
cerned about employment than outside shareholders, such as institutional investors. The 
latter are most likely to enforce restructuring in order to maximize company value. Boy-
cko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) mention that even after privatization governments often 
support excess labor spending by granting subsidization to companies. Large outside inves-
tors are less cash constrained and usually do not rely on financial aid from the state. There-
fore, these shareholders are less likely to accept subsidies to abandon heavy restructuring 
to keep up employment. 
 
In the chapter “Ownership Structures and Performance” I have outlined that large share-
holders are to some extend beneficial to a company’s performance. The same holds true for 
privatization, since agency costs of managerial control may increase without the presence 
of large investors, even when the costs of political control fall (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Claessens and Djankov (1999) echo these conclusions in a study of privatized Czech com-
panies, by reporting a negative relation between employee ownership and profitability, 
whereas they measure efficiency gains with the presence of large shareholders in a privati-
zation process. Also Frydman et al. (1997) find no significant improvements in corporate 
performance when ownership resides with company insiders, whereas outside ownership 
after privatization is positively linked to firm performance. 
 
The presence of foreign ownership is generally associated with greater efficiency gains. 
Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2001) analyze 209 privatized firms from 39 countries 
over the period 1980 to 2001, and report significant profitability and efficiency gains with 
the presence of foreign ownership. Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) finds similar results for privat-
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ized Mexican firms. The author concludes that foreign ownership drives up competition 
and consequently leads to higher premiums for the governments in auction privatization. 
 
Although governments in many states realize that foreign ownership is related to signifi-
cant advantages in terms of technological and managerial progress, which contributes to 
the overall modernization of a country’s economy, many nationals are sceptical due to 
fears of foreign control and exploitation (Hinds and Pohl, 1991). In fact, foreign ownership 
is a very limited resource, since international investors are facing political, legal, informa-
tional and linguistic barriers. These obstacles prevent foreigners from investing in coun-
tries they are not familiar with. Therefore, it is the role of the state to liberalize foreign 
investment laws to attract foreign capital. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Studies on Privatization Effects 
 
In many empirical studies scholars provide evidence that the arguments cited above are of 
practical importance. In their study of the 500 largest non-financial Canadian firms, 
Boardman and Vining (1992) report significantly higher levels of profitability and effi-
ciency for private companies after controlling for size and market share. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) show in their empirical work covering the 500 largest non-US companies 
in 1975, 1985 and 1995, that private firms are more profitable, have lower debt-levels and 
less labor intensive production processes than state-owned enterprises. These results are 
controlled for company size, location, industry and business-cycle effects. The authors 
find, however, that these gains are not directly associated with privatization. Rather in-
creases in profitability are more likely to occur prior to privatization. Explanations for their 
findings are for instance good economic perspectives of future privatization, that improve 
firm performance prior to any privatization measures, or governments, which tend to pri-
vatize companies, which have recently become profitable. Another reason for ex-ante pri-
vatization effects is the manager’s incentive to prove his ability in anticipation of privatiza-
tion, in order to be held accountable by the new owners (Pohl et al., 1997). La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) analyze data from 92 countries and conclude that state 
ownership above a certain level negatively affects the development of financial systems, 
which in turn has a negative impact on a company’s profitability.  
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In a study of 79 firms in 21 developing countries Boubakri and Cosset (1998) document a 
significantly positive impact of privatization on output efficiency, profitability, capital 
spending, dividend payments and (surprisingly) employment levels, whereas leverage is 
reduced considerably after privatization. In an analysis comprising both, developing and 
developed economies, D’Souza and Megginson (1999) receive similar results except for a 
significant decline in employment after privatization. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(1999) examine the post-privatization performance of 218 Mexican firms over the period 
1983-1991. Again, they find a significant increase in firm profitability resulting primarily 
from reductions in labor spending.  
 
Pohl et al. (1997) measure financial and operating data for more than 6,300 industrial com-
panies from 1992 to 1995 in seven Central and Eastern European countries, and find that 
within the first four years after privatization firms will increase productivity 3-5 times 
more than similar state-owned companies. 
 
Nonetheless, one has to be cautious in interpreting the results of studies on privatization 
and corporate performance. Megginson and Netter (2001) argue that scholars are facing the 
possibility of sample selection bias, since many governments privatize the more profitable 
companies in order to generate acceptance for their privatization programs. Apart from 
that, cross-national research has to deal with a lack of data availability, mainly in less de-
veloped countries. This leads to an unequally distributed sample among the observed coun-
tries (developed countries are therefore given too much weight). Finally, the authors state 
that fundamental reasons drive the matter of fact, why certain companies are state-owned 
(for instance state interventions to bail out companies as a result of market failure). These 
factors have significant effects on studies dealing with the difference in corporate perform-
ance between public and private or privatized companies, and may lead to biases in the 
results of empirical papers in this field. 
 
Privatization drives a wedge between politics and management, or in other words, depoliti-
cises companies. This process involves a lot of effort from the government, since the 
state’s role has to be redefined according to its financing, ownership and regulatory role. 
Whereas ownership and financing responsibilities must be passed on to the new proprie-
tors, regulatory roles must be strengthened in order to ensure a smooth and efficient priva-
tization (Hinds and Pohl, 1991). 
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2.4 Privatization in Transition Economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
 
This chapter highlights the most important elements of the privatization process in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), by explaining the development of privatization in these coun-
tries, and discussing the challenges governments were facing, particularly during the first 
decade of transition. 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has raised many hopes for a considerable increase in 
the standard of living in CEE. A key reform towards an efficient market economy was the 
privatization of many hundreds of thousands state-owned companies. Due to the huge 
number of firms to be privatized and the relatively short time horizon of governments, 
mass or voucher privatization had become a popular method of privatization in CEE. In 
1991 the Czech Republic was the first country in CEE to conduct mass privatization by 
distributing coupons among the population. The citizens could either use their coupons to 
bid for shares to invest directly in any of the companies, or invest in a diversified portfolio 
of privatized companies by turning over their coupons to an investment fund. 
 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania followed with similar mass privatization programs, how-
ever, not as massive and rapid as those of the Czech Republic. Other countries in CEE, 
such as Hungary or Slovenia relied primarily on step-by-step privatization rather than mass 
privatization. Critics of mass privatization had argued that this type of privatization would 
lead to inefficient and dispersed ownership structures with no positive impact on a com-
pany’s governance. However, the structure of ownership after voucher privatization had 
become much more concentrated than anticipated, since large investment funds gained 
considerable stakes in companies by providing diversified portfolios to the public. Though, 
ownership concentration through large investment funds did not result in efficient control 
in corporations, since minority shareholder protection was relatively weak. As a result, 
expropriation by corporate or fund managers was likely to occur. 
 
Due to the lack of foreign investments (the reasons are mentioned below), many firms 
were sold to local domestic investors. Thus, privatization to managers and employees was 
a very common method to transfer ownership into private hands. In many countries in 
CEE, particularly in Hungary, Poland and Ex-Yugoslavia, unions were very strong and 
consequently the notion of worker ownership had already been very popular, even before 
23 
the first large-scale privatizations took place. Non-transferable worker ownership initially 
posed a large obstacle for full-scale privatization and supported insider privatization. As a 
consequence, governments imposed laws against self-management to enforce conversion 
of all assets within a corporation in the case of privatization. 
 
To combine a rapid privatization with longer-term involvement in restructuring processes 
privatization agencies were set up as intermediary parties between the state and individual 
investors. Their responsibilities varied greatly across countries, from acting in a purely 
advisory capacity to monitoring a company’s activities to direct involvement in a firm’s 
management as a holding company. Though, the overall objective of these institutions was 
the same: Preparing companies for privatization through initial public offerings, auctions, 
direct sales or management buyouts (Brada, 1996). Implementing privatization agencies as 
an intermediary party resulted in the advantage, that the completion of the whole process 
was postponed until a reasonably fair valuation of the privatized companies was feasible 
(Hinds and Pohl, 1991). By this time a sound valuation of firms was difficult because capi-
tal markets barely existed. By the end of the transition process privatization agencies were 
self-terminating, leaving ownership directly with the new shareholders. 
 
Finally, housing and agricultural land was partly privatized through restitution of property, 
formerly expropriated by the state during communism. After World War II large estates 
were broken up and distributed among the public. Owners were forced to join collective 
farms in order to receive nominal ownership of their land. Though, they virtually had no 
control over their land and could not sell or lease it. This created various obstacles during 
privatization 40 years later, since land records were rather incomplete and property was 
defined vaguely due to the principle of collective farming (Brada, 1996). Despite these 
problems, some countries, such as Bulgaria, utilized this method to return much of the ag-
ricultural land to former owners or their heirs. Courts and government agencies created 
restitution funds, which were responsible for compensating society for wrong-doing by 
individuals, corporations or the state.  
 
Although all countries in CEE aimed to create efficient market economies, economic per-
formance has varied greatly across the transition countries. Central European countries, 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia or Slovenia generally performed 
better than the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which in turn reported a more 
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efficient transition process than the Balkan States of Bulgaria and Romania (Svejnar, 
2002). The privatization strategies, these countries have implemented, have differed 
greatly regarding the speed of the privatization program, the privatization method or the 
openness towards foreign investors. Though, it can not be generalized which privatization 
strategy is most suitable for economic success in CEE, since other country-specific factors, 
such as politics, the country’s budget deficit, the degree of insider control or the size of the 
capital market influence the overall outcome of the transition process (Schaft, Schläger and 
Schnitzer, 2003). 
 
2.4.1 Challenges during Privatization in Transition Economies in Central and East-
ern Europe 
 
Privatization programs in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) can not be compared to those 
I have mentioned previously in the United Kingdom and in Western Europe. Although 
these privatization waves were significant and massive, they happened under completely 
different circumstances than those in the so called transition economies in CEE. In the lat-
ter states governments had to manage a sudden transition from a highly distorted command 
economy with many heavily indebted companies to a market economy within a considera-
bly shorter period of time than their Western European counterparts. Furthermore, state-
owned companies in developed countries, such as France, Germany, or other Western 
European countries had already been facing a rather well-established market environment 
with substantial competition from the private sector (Hinds and Pohl, 1991).  
 
By contrast, economies in CEE were dominated entirely by state enterprises. Whereas the 
public sector accounted for a share of 10 percent to 20 percent of the countries’ GDP in the 
period between 1982 and 1986 in Western European countries, this number had been be-
tween 65 percent (Hungary) and 91 percent (Czechoslovakia) respectively in CEE (Mila-
novic, 1991). 
 
Having these figures in mind, governments in CEE were pressurized by the European Un-
ion to introduce large-scale privatization programs in order to create normal market 
economies. Being in the shadow of the strong European alliance many countries were 
striving for the goal to join the European Union (EU) in the foreseeable future. In 1993 the 
European Council announced officially that privatization is one of the key criteria, CEE 
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countries had to fulfil, regarding an entry into the EU. Hence, companies located in CEE 
had to be able to respond to increasing competition from Western Europe and manage to 
survive without future support from the state. A possible accession to the European Union 
had been regarded as a strong incentive for investors to place funds in CEE, and created a 
unique opportunity for governments to develop national capital markets. 
 
Although many industries are still controlled by large state-owned companies, there has 
been a significant transfer of property rights into private hands over the last two decades, 
resulting in a substantial increase of the private sector (see Figure 3 for 2001). 
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Figure 3: Private Sector Share of GDP in CEE Countries in 2001 
Source: European Bank for Restructuring and Development (EBRD) 
 
 
Despite attractive fundamentals in CEE, even after large-scale privatization programs these 
economies still lag substantially behind in terms of productivity in comparison to other 
countries, particularly the developed G7-nations (I deliberately exclude the new G8-nation 
Russia due to similar problems in the very country). 
 
Laban and Wolf (1993) give reason for this competitive disadvantage of CEE economies. 
They state that a sudden transition from a planned to a market economy entails a signifi-
cant reduction in the standard of living in the initial phase of transition. These declines are 
due to ex ante unknown, and to some extend unexpected costs, associated with the setting 
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up of an efficient market economy, such as the implementation of social-security systems, 
institutional reforms or a reorientation of the transportation and communication infrastruc-
ture towards the new external environment. In addition, production output is reduced con-
siderably due to temporary closings of rundown production sites, which are subject to re-
structuring in the early stages of the transition process. Pohl et al (1997) state that many 
firms were forced to enter Western European markets as demand from former socialist 
countries had declined considerably and their home markets were enormously embattled 
by international competitors. Since these markets had significantly higher quality stan-
dards, companies had to deal with an enormous contraction of their profit margins. Apart 
from that, economies in Western Europe did unexpectedly well during the 1990s, which 
raised the bar for economic success for countries in CEE. As a consequence, many firms 
became unprofitable and the countries were sliding into a severe economic recession with 
double-digit unemployment rates. 
 
Among investors and the country’s population these facts had created uncertainty and 
doubt about the overall success of the privatization program, leading to larger than ex-
pected obstacles for privatization. People had expected that the fall of the communism 
would immediately boost economic growth and make their countries more competitive to 
the Western European market. Unfortunately, these people recognized soon, that an effi-
cient transition would not happen overnight. The low levels of foreign participation in pri-
vatization within the first years of transition particularly reflect investors’ uncertainty. Be-
sides, foreign corporations did not dare to carry out painful restructuring measures, which 
could have detrimental effects on a company’s corporate identity or image. Therefore, 
many firms stayed away from CEE markets. According to the OECD foreign sources of 
privatization revenues by the end of 1995 had varied between 5 percent in the Czech Re-
public and 24 percent in Bulgaria, except for Hungary, which was able to disclose a major-
ity ownership by foreign investors of 58 percent. 
 
The transition to markets had initially been regarded as a risky investment project, with a 
trade-off between sacrificing current productivity and higher expected future productivity. 
Figure 4 illustrates the initial declines in economic output and per capita GDP at the begin-
ning of the transition process in countries in CEE. 
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Source: EBRD (2004) 
 
Laban and Wolf (1993) argue that the front-end costs of transition were underestimated at 
the beginning of privatization and consequently raised the voice among the population to-
wards governments to abandon a pro-capitalist regime. The resulting political pressure 
against investment-friendly policies, which entails a decline in the front-end welfare of 
citizens, forced governments to reverse some of the pro-privatization policies, and adopt 
only partial market oriented reforms with weak legal systems. Thus, policy-sustainability 
and corruption, due to weak legal systems, were other factors that contributed to increased 
uncertainty among investors, and in unexpected initial difficulties in the transition process. 
  
Another reason for lower productivity in CEE, even after implementing a free market 
economy, was the initially weak banking system in the very countries. Pohl et al (1997) 
report poor bank lending practices in favor of ailing state firms and a resulting decline in 
productivity and profitability with regard to additional bank lending. The authors conclude 
that in the early phase of transition, companies were likely to use bank loans to finance 
losses instead of realizing restructuring. As a consequence, in the early 1990s economies 
were suffering from exploding inflation rates between 100 and 2,000 percent due to exten-
sive and poor bank lending practices. Elevated inflation rates decelerated the transition 
towards markets, since macro-economies can not function in an environment without rea-
sonable price stability (Hinds and Pohl, 1991). Due to huge depreciations of banks on 
credit defaults many financial institutions had to be bailed out by governments. Though, by 
1995 in many countries in CEE the tide has turned, since a large consolidation in the bank-
Figure 4: Development of Economic Output and GDP per Capita in CEE countries 
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ing sector resulted in a banking system dominated by western banks with restructuring-
supportive bank loans, better lending practices and market-based banking systems. 
 
Hence, even in the presence of favorable fundamentals privatization in CEE had not been 
as efficient as in comparable economies, though, it contributed significantly to the overall 
stability and productivity of the region’s economy. 
 
Still, it is the overall objective of governments in CEE to create a flexible and efficient 
market economy by ensuring macroeconomic stability, enforcing price and market re-
forms, a smooth transition of property rights and a complete redefinition of the role of the 
state in controlling and monitoring firms operating in the very country. Apart from this, a 
market-oriented legal framework provides the basis for any step towards an efficient transi-
tion process. 
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3 Corporate Governance in Transition Countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe 
 
A country’s corporate governance system is a set of laws and regulations, institutions and 
practices that determine how and in whose interest a company will be run (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001). 
 
Due to the historical command economy corporate governance models in transition 
economies in CEE are considerably younger than the well-settled Western European or 
U.S. ones. Thus, they are more open to reform and more flexible in adopting successful 
features of other corporate governance systems. Since the transition into a market economy 
in those countries had changed property rights and other corporate governance issues dra-
matically, the countries’ systems have been highly influenced by the overall transition 
process at the beginning of the 1990s. Whereas Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that cor-
porate governance was practically nonexistent before privatization, Pistor, Raiser and 
Gelfer (1999) provide evidence, that many transition economies nowadays show higher 
levels of investor rights protection than many highly developed market economies. The 
latter authors apply the investor rights indices developed by La Porta et al. (1998) in Law 
and Finance to the transition economies in CEE. They point out that regarding both, share-
holder rights and creditor rights, transition economies are considerably above the world 
average comprising 49 common-law and civil-law countries. However, the authors remark 
that, despite comprehensive laws on the books, their enforcement is rather weak, as a result 
of poor regulatory institutions. Thus, transition economies in CEE provide favorable condi-
tions for corruption or bribery. 
 
Furthermore, the lack of external finance to replace state funding, managerial entrench-
ment of incumbent managers and the remaining influence of the state as a controlling body 
provide significant problems for the implementation of an effective corporate governance 
system (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 1999).  
 
The next chapters highlight the privatization process of the countries Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovenia, its effects on corporate governance due to transition, and the problems and 
difficulties, the governments in the very countries had to deal with, in order to implement a 
free market economy. 
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3.1 Privatization and Corporate Governance in Bulgaria 
 
3.1.1 Corporate Governance Issues during Bulgarian Privatization 
 
Bulgaria, one of the largest states in CEE, introduced its privatization program relatively 
late in 1996. Since economic and political situations were far from being stable, privatiza-
tion has slowly gained momentum. By the end of 1994 Bulgaria ranked last across all 
countries in CEE regarding the share of the private sector in GDP (Podkaminer, 1995). 
One could assume that the deferred steps towards a market economy would have provided 
several advantages to regulatory bodies in Bulgaria, since the Bulgarians were in the posi-
tion to observe problems other governments were facing through the implementation of 
privatization programs. Thus, they would have been able to design a regulatory framework 
regarding privatization and concurrent changes in corporate governance to overcome cer-
tain difficulties that had not been foreseen earlier (Miller, 2006). 
 
Though, corporate governance mechanisms in Bulgaria were formed with certain time lag 
(Keremidchiev, 2004). Initially, privatization was only poorly regulated by the “Law for 
Transformation and Privatization of the State Owned and Municipal Owned Enterprises 
Act”, which was passed by the National Assembly in April 1992, and formed the legal 
basis for all privatization methods implemented in Bulgaria. Due to the fact that privatiza-
tion funds in Bulgaria were, in contrast to Poland or Romania, founded by private legal 
entities and not by the government, the founders of those funds could easily seize their 
funds and reallocate the public wealth in their possession without the presence of a com-
prehensive regulatory system. Miller (2006) reports that among the 81 privatization funds, 
that were founded, originally only 30 were still listed on the exchange and about 15 funds 
were actively traded. This resulted in an extremely unequally allocated social structure. 
The government reacted by introducing bans, sanctions, strict regimes and regulations, 
however, it was too late. The delay of regulatory mechanisms forming resulted in a very 
prolonged process towards an efficient market economy (Keremidchiev, 2004). 
 
Another weak point of Bulgaria’s corporate governance system was the asynchronous 
regulations for private and public enterprises. Private companies took advantage of the 
unlimited issues of loans by banks and favorable tax rates, whereas state enterprises were 
under strict political, formal and managerial control. In a study comprising 2,515 Bulgarian 
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privatized companies, Miller (2006) gives evidence for the preferential conditions of pri-
vate enterprises by reporting no bankruptcies among those companies between 1996 and 
2001, although the firms experienced a severe financial crisis in 1996 and 1997. Miller 
agrees with Keremidchiev that this was mainly due to weak bankruptcy laws and soft 
budget constraints by this time. 
 
The government had dealt severely with public enterprises, limiting their opportunities 
significantly. Without authorization from the state many transactions could not be con-
ducted. Managers’ decisions were administratively slowed down since the government’s 
administrative capacity was very weak. Although regulations regarding corporate govern-
ance, such as a mandatory convention of an annual general assembly or the approval of 
balance sheets and financial statements, had been enacted, the lack of qualified people to 
monitor public companies had been destructive to the enterprises’ development. Keremid-
chiev states that in 1997 about 20 officials in the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic 
Cooperation were responsible for 426 state enterprises. Therefore, public enterprises de-
veloped less rapidly than their private counterparts, and thus, were regarded as unattractive 
for potential investors, which resulted in the fact, that even nowadays the Bulgarian gov-
ernment seeks buyers for some of its run-down companies.  
 
3.1.2 The Bulgarian Privatization Process 
 
Initially Bulgaria adopted a strongly decentralized approach to privatization. Cash privati-
zation, where the state offers public assets for sale to local or foreign investors and man-
agement-employee buyouts (MEBOs) were implemented at the beginning of the transition 
process. A considerable part of these transactions were for small enterprises with fixed 
assets of less than BGL 70 million (about USD 48,000) (see figure 5). These privatization 
methods provided only limited success, at least initially (Miller, 2006).  
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Figure 5: Distribution of Privatization Deals by the Value of Fixed Assets (until 1996) 
Source: Miller (2006) 
 
 
MEBOs had enjoyed several preferences, such as an initial payment of only 10 percent of 
the agreed price. The outstanding amount had to be paid within ten years, increased with a 
favorable interest rate half of the average bank rate of interest. But due to weak regulations 
concerning MEBOs and the decentralized approach to privatization, “spontaneous privati-
zation” created opportunities for managers and foreign partners to expropriate employees 
to fully enjoy the advantages of MEBOs. Managers had made themselves irreplaceable and 
did not see advantages of sharing control with other employees (Kostourkov, 2002). Meg-
ginson and Netter (2001) state that most studies on privatization and firm performance in 
CEE document stronger performance impacts of privatization if the management is re-
placed than in the case of managers who remain with significant control rights after priva-
tization. Hence, managerial entrenchment in Bulgaria prohibited any major changes in the 
management board, and thus, did not result in positive developments in corporate perform-
ance. Furthermore, companies privatized through MEBOs had difficulties in raising addi-
tional capital and their management had a lack of experience in free markets. Another ex-
planation for the worse performance of these companies is that there had not been any in-
vestment interest by other parties, due to the company’s unattractive financial and eco-
nomic condition, resulting in a MEBO to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation. Between 1993 
and 2001 about 1,400 MEBO deals had been completed. Only a minimal percentage turned 
out to be successful.  
 
Thus, due to the country’s size, the large share of state ownership and the very limited fi-
nancial resources citizens had to buy state companies, mass privatization, as introduced by 
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the Czech Republic in 1992, and privatization through restitution had been regarded as the 
most efficient opportunities to transfer assets to the population at large. 
 
In 1996 the Bulgarian government introduced the first round of voucher privatization, co-
ordinated by the Centre of Mass Privatization and prepared by the Privatization Agency. 
During the first round large enterprises were only partially privatized with a maximum 
stake of 25 percent. Regarding small and medium companies the state offered up to 90 
percent of a company’s stake, holding back the rest of the shares for claims through restitu-
tion. Foreign investors could participate in privatization through cash offers or the founda-
tion of privatization funds, but not through the purchase of investment vouchers. Among 
the 81 privatization funds in Bulgaria, 13 were founded by foreign entities (Todeva and 
Kuntchev, 2000). 
 
Employees, managers and former employees of companies to be privatized were able to 
acquire up to 10 percent of the shares offered for sale free of charge. Investors could 
choose between exchanging their vouchers for shares in a diversified portfolio offered by 
privatization funds, or bid directly for a company’s shares at the auction. Altogether, 1,040 
companies from all sectors of the economy, which is equal to one-fourth of Bulgaria’s 
state-owned enterprises, were (partially) privatized during the first mass privatization 
round. 
 
Due to the privatization of companies across almost all industrial sectors, 80 percent of 
Bulgaria’s citizens recognized the advantages of portfolio diversification by transferring 
their vouchers to the 81 privatization funds. 
 
In 1999 the government implemented a second round of voucher privatization after certain 
amendments to the Privatization Act had been made. Public auctions as a combination of 
cash and voucher privatization were introduced, which provided the opportunity for active 
privatization of foreign investors in public auctions.  
 
After the second round of mass privatization had been completed, the Bulgarian govern-
ment placed great importance to the privatization of the state’s largest enterprises. There-
fore, the Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act (PPCA) was adopted in 2002, 
under which privatization became more centralized under the special guidance of the Pri-
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vatization Agency. Direct negotiations with potential buyers were abolished and decentral-
ized approaches avoided, since the Bulgarian economy had experienced many cases of 
managerial fraud in the past. Rather public tenders and public auctions had become the 
main methods for privatization of large enterprises. The process was fully open to foreign 
investors, treating them equally to local buyers. Table 1 illustrates details about privatiza-
tion deals with foreign investors concluded by the Privatization Agency. The most impor-
tant investors are from Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Russia 
and the United States. Conspicuous is the year 2005, where the Privatization Agency has 
not realized any privatization deal with foreign investors, reflecting the difficulties Bul-
garia is facing to catch up with other more developed transition countries such as the 
Czech Republic or Slovenia. 
 
Year Number of Tran-sactions 
Revenues (thou-
sand USD) Largest Deal 
Agreed Price 
(thousand USD) Country of Buyer
1993 2 22,052 Tzarevichni Pro-ducti PLC 20,000 Belgium 
1994 8 73,345 Hotel Vitosha 36,230 Germany 
1995 4 12,756 Burgarska Pivo PLC 5,020 Belgium 
1996 13 48,639 Sheraton Sofia Balkan 22,300 Korea 
1997 20 354,283 Sodi JSCo 160,000 Belgium 
1998 14 76,360 Drujba JSCo 20,000 Greece 
1999 24 206,023 Neftoxim JSCo 101,000 Syria 
2000 7 25,667 VEC Pirin and VEC Spanchevo 15,000 France 
2001 1 5,466 Transimpeks SP JSCo 5,466 Syria 
2002 10 49,545 
VEC Popina Laka, 
VEC Lilianovo 
and VEC 
Sandanska 
33,057 Czech Republic 
2003 9 1,062 Vidima AD 210 United States 
2004 9 1,183,220 BTC EAD 292,652 Austria 
2005 No deals n.V. n.V. n.V. n.V. 
2006 1 259,400 TPP Varna EAD 259,400 Czech Republic 
2007 3 169,336 DHC Russe EAD 116,182 Slovenia 
 
Table 1: Bulgarian Privatization Deals with Foreign Investors 
Source: Privatization Agency (2008) 
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Although the largest enterprises were privatized by means of mass privatizations or public 
offerings to domestic or foreign buyers, the majority of the companies had passed into pri-
vate hands through restitution. Within the first years of transition about 22,000 enterprises, 
which is equal to 90 percent of the privatized entities, had been privatized through this 
method. These were mainly small companies in the trade and services sector, such as 
shops, restaurants and hotels (Prohaska, 1996). Restoration of ownership rights helped to 
establish a functioning real estate market and promoted entrepreneurship among Bulgaria’s 
citizens. 
 
Summing up the Bulgarian privatization process, the government initially privatized small 
and medium sized companies through restitution, cash privatization and MEBOs. After 
dissatisfying results and many cases of managerial fraud, due to a decentralized privatiza-
tion process, two large voucher privatization phases were introduced in 1996 and 1999 
respectively. Having transferred property for most of the small and medium sized compa-
nies into private hands, a new law was adopted in 2002 to sell the largest companies from 
the key sectors of the economy in a more centralized approach by means of public tenders 
or public auctions. Thus, although cash privatization initially achieved disappointing re-
sults, it had been regarded as the most efficient method to privatize the country’s “heavy-
weights”. 
 
By July 2008, around 92 percent of the assets which are subject to privatization have been 
transferred to private entities (Bulgarian Privatization Agency, 2008). This indicates that 
the privatization process draws to the close. The mass privatization program promoted the 
development of corporate governance in Bulgaria, though, not as significant as in other 
transition economies, and persuaded over three million Bulgarian citizens to participate 
actively in the domestic stock market. Figure 6 illustrates the development of the market 
capitalization of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE) and the performance of the SOFIX, 
Bulgaria’s leading share index since its inception in 2000.  
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Figure 6: Monthly Market Capitalization of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE) and Performance of 
the SOFIX, Bulgaria’s leading share index 
Source: Bulgarian Stock Exchange, Bloomberg 
 
 
However, the country still has to deal with a considerable rate of corruption, most wide-
spread in the judicial system, the political parties and the area of health care. According to 
the corruption perception index, calculated by Transparency International, the country has 
not made any progress in impeding corruption since 2001. For 2007 the index for Bulgaria 
is 4.1 points from a 10 point scale, which represents the second worst score among the 
members of the EU. Together with double-digit unemployment and inflation rates, the sec-
ond highest poverty rate in the EU, and political instability, Bulgaria, as one of the trouble 
makers within the EU, still has enormous difficulties in attracting investors, who prefer to 
forgo taking excessive risk. Though, the country has experienced rapid economic growth in 
recent years and benefits from the current emerging market boom. The accession to the EU 
in 2007 can be regarded as an economic milestone at the end of the initially unexpected 
slow-going process towards free international markets. 
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3.2 Privatization and Corporate Governance in Romania 
 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance Issues during Romanian Privatization 
 
Romania, with a population of 22.3 million even larger than its Balkan neighbour Bulgaria, 
was facing similar difficulties in implementing an efficient market economy, such as a long 
recession with worsened living standards, hyperinflation rates, extreme poverty, a high 
level of corruption and an unstable political situation. Besides, the country experienced a 
strong political and public rejection towards the transition process, which resulted in a 
widening gap on a political level between the former communists and the democratic op-
position. For this reason the government hesitated to fully enforce economic reforms that 
would have entailed temporary additional costs and an increase in unemployment. Without 
public support from the population the overall process to implement free markets was a 
very tough and slow one. Due to many changes of governments and permanent amend-
ments to privatization acts, international investors had been very cautious in investing in 
Romanian enterprises.  
 
Such conflicts of interests and many loopholes in the legislation provided a favorable con-
dition for the emergence of corruption. According to the Transparency International 2007 
Corruption Perception Index, Romania, with a score of 3.7 on the 10 point scale, had been 
outpaced by Bulgaria during the last years and currently ranks last among the members of 
the EU. 
 
Figure 7: Development of Corruption Perception Index 
Source: Transparency International 
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The Romanian society regards customs officials, the police and parliamentarians as the 
most corruptive occupational groups. In addition, a particularly well developed shadow 
economy and quasi-monopolies in many key segments of the Romanian economy hindered 
the transition process considerably (Bertelsmann Transformation Index Report, 2003). 
Early entrants into the Romanian economy had enjoyed preferential treatment and put bar-
riers in the way towards a complete market liberalization and full transparency, since this 
would have diminished their competitive advantages. 
 
Similar to Bulgaria, Romania’s relatively weak public governance with its limited adminis-
trative capacity had been a constraint to implement economic reforms smoothly. The gov-
ernment had reacted through the offering of more competitive wages and additional incen-
tives to civil servants to attract and retain the most qualified staff in order to carry out the 
administrative process more efficiently. 
 
Furthermore, certain improvements have been made regarding Romania’s formerly weak 
financial system. On the verge of a severe banking crisis the government started a compre-
hensive banking system reform. After a successful restructuring process of the practically 
insolvent state-owned banks and the creation of a two-tier banking system, the Romanian 
government managed to overcome even bigger banking troubles (Badulescu and 
Badulescu, 2008). 
 
Striving for EU membership, Romania recognized the importance of an effective corporate 
governance system that complies with European standards. The introduction of the Corpo-
rate Governance Code in June 2000, based on the principle “comply or explain”, and a 
gradual implementation of the international accounting standards (IAS) give evidence that, 
although the Romanian corporate governance system is still rather weak, it is “reasonably 
good” compared to other transition countries in CEE (Sigma Bleyzer, 2003). According to 
the Doing Business 2008 report Romania outperforms most of the other transition coun-
tries and is significantly above the OECD average regarding transparency of transactions, 
liability for self-dealing and investor protection. The only criterion where Romania has a 
lot of catching up to do is the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for miscon-
duct (see Table 2). This can be explained primarily by the large impact of corruption on the 
country’s judicature.  
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Indicator Romania CEE OECD 
Disclosure Index 9.00 4.90 6.40 
Director Liability Index 5.00 3.80 5.10 
Shareholder Suits Index 4.00 6.30 6.50 
Investor Protection Index 6.00 5.00 6.00 
 
Table 2: Corporate Governance Indices: Romania vs. CEE and OECD 
Source: Badulescu A. and Badulescu D. (2008) 
 
 
Despite the fact, that many transition criteria had not been met yet, the European Union 
decided to start accession negotiations with Romania in 1999, due to the country’s stabiliz-
ing role during the Balkan conflict. Since then the Romanian economy has recovered as-
tonishingly. In 2007 GDP growth in real terms was recorded at 7.7 percent, which is one of 
the highest rates in Europe. The unemployment rate dropped to 3.9 percent in September 
2007, which is comparatively low to Western European countries, such as Spain, Germany 
or France and significantly lower than Romania’s Central and Eastern European 
neighbours. This indicates that Romania is on the right path to achieve macroeconomic 
stability, despite many difficulties, the country has been facing during the first decade of 
transition. 
 
3.2.2 The Romanian Privatization Process 
 
The Romanian privatization process has been quite heterogeneous, comprising all major 
privatization methods, such as management-employee buyouts (MEBOs), mass privatiza-
tion or sales to outside investors. This resulted in a diversity of privatization outcomes, 
including employee, state, dispersed and concentrated outside ownership (Earle and 
Telegdy, 2002). 
  
Similar to Bulgaria, the first period of transition in Romania was a very difficult and slow 
process (the reasons were mentioned in the previous chapter). Though, the Romanian gov-
ernment carried out the first privatizations, mainly small and medium-sized enterprises, 
relatively early in 1990. Within the first five years of transition MEBOs had been the 
dominating privatization method. Thus, Romania is among the countries with the largest 
percentage of insider dominated firms, with employee ownership many times close to 100 
percent (Telegdy, 2002). Insider owners enjoyed preferential treatment, such as credits 
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granted by the State Ownership Fund (SOF) with highly negative real interest rates or the 
suspension of the profit tax until credits are fully repaid to the SOF. These favorable pur-
chasing conditions were included in the whole privatization process, resulting in a signifi-
cant impact of MEBOs during all of the periods of privatization. 
 
Mass privatization in the form of voucher systems was implemented in two phases 1992 
and 1995. The overall privatization process was coordinated by three institutions: the Na-
tional Agency for Privatization (NAP), which was responsible for the monitoring of the 
privatization process, the SOF, which ensured the transfer of state property to private own-
ership and the five Private Ownership Funds (POFs). Whereas the SOF was founded to 
terminate its operations after the fund’s portfolio had been privatized, the POFs were trans-
formed into closed end investment funds and listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange 
(BVB) after the second round of mass privatization in 1996. The latter issued certificates 
representing participations in these funds which in turn served as stakes in various public 
companies. The Romanian population could choose between exchanging its coupons for 
shares in companies, selling them against cash or exchanging them for certificates of the 
five POFs. 
  
Before the first phase of mass privatization took place the Romanian government adopted 
the Law on Privatization of Enterprises in the second half of 1992. According to its con-
tent, the state’s companies were categorized in 800 strategic companies, called “Regii 
Autonome”, which had been excluded from the general privatization process, and the re-
maining 6,300 non-strategic enterprises, which had been part of the first round of mass 
privatization. The strategic companies included Romania’s key sectors, such as defence, 
energy supply, transportation and other primary industries (Stelzer-O’Neill, 2000). These 
companies had been very capital-intensive, accounting for about 47 percent of the total 
book value of public enterprises in Romania by 1997 (Romanian Development Agency, 
1997).  
 
During the first round of mass privatization in 1992, coupons amounting to 30 percent of 
the capital share of the 6,300 non-strategic enterprises were distributed among the popula-
tion. The remaining 70 percent of the capital share was managed by the SOF. Despite con-
centrated efforts to transfer ownership into private hands, only 20 percent of all public 
companies had been privatized until 1995. Therefore, the government implemented another 
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attempt of mass privatization in the respective year by reducing the state’s share in non-
strategic enterprises to 40 percent. In contrast to the first round of privatization no cash 
sales of coupons were permitted in order to accelerate the mass privatization process, since 
only direct investments in companies or POFs had been possible. Altogether, 91 percent of 
the Romanian population participated in the mass privatization process, whereas only 15 
percent remained in the hands of the five POFs. These results were totally contrary to the 
Bulgarian mass privatization process where privatization funds appealed to the majority of 
the population. 
 
Stelzer-O’Neill (2000) and Earle and Telegdy (2002) give two plausible explanations for 
the unpopularity of Romanian POFs. On the one hand, the state retained significant control 
rights within a considerable amount of privatized companies, even after two phases of 
mass privatization. Earle and Telegdy (2002) report a positive stake of the SOF in three-
quarters of the privatized companies with an average stake of 46.9 percent within those 
enterprises. On the other hand, the actual role of the POFs within the privatized companies 
had been defined very loosely. Although POFs held minority holdings of more than 25 
percent in many corporations, an active collaboration with the companies’ managements 
was technically not feasible for the funds, which were responsible for portfolios of more 
than 1,500 companies (Stelzer-O’Neill, 2000). Thus, the POFs had got their hands full with 
handling the process of registering coupons and exchanging them for the funds’ certifi-
cates. Although dividend payments conducted by the companies within the portfolios were 
announced to be passed on to investors, the administrative costs exceeded any dividend 
yield. The following table compares the responsibility of Romanian funds to their Polish 
counterparts and points out the enormous administrative efforts Rumanian POFs had to 
undertake in order to ensure a smooth transition process.  
 
  Poland Romania 
Start of Mass Privatization Process 1994 1992 
Number of Privatization Funds 15 5 
Number of Companies to be privatized during Mass 
Privatization 
512 12,000 
Avg. Number of Companies in a Fund’s Portfolio 34 2,400 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Romania’s and Poland’s Privatization Funds’ Responsibilities 
Source: Stelzer-O’Neill (2000) 
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Due to the fact that the Romanian privatization funds were primarily employed with ad-
ministrative problems and could not actively participate in any restructuring process, they 
virtually had no significant effect on the privatization process apart from transferring pub-
lic ownership to private entities (Stelzer-O’Neill, 2000). The low popularity of the POFs 
resulted in an even more dispersed ownership structure than expected, since most of the 
Romanians preferred to invest directly in enterprises. Besides, the state retained between 
40 and 51 percent of the shares in every company included in the voucher privatization 
process for latter direct sales. As a consequence of the partial privatization and unpopular 
privatization funds, the ownership structure of companies, involved in the Romanian 
voucher privatization process, was extremely dispersed with the state as the only block-
holder with a controlling stake (Telegdy, 2002). 
  
Within the first six to seven years of privatization the government had neglected to privat-
ize the country’s largest state enterprises, partially because of their weak financial situation 
and the threat of an upsurge in unemployment. Only strict requirements imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the perspectives to join the EU in the foreseeable 
future imposed pressure on the privatization process of the 800 strategic companies.  
 
After the transformation of the POFs in closed end investment funds and the foundation of 
the RASDAQ, an exchange for small and medium sized start-up enterprises, the govern-
ment introduced a large scale privatization process of the country’s strategic companies, 
mainly in the form of privatization sales, starting in 1997. The government decided to sell 
its key enterprises by means of privatization sales, such as auctions, direct negotiations and 
public offerings, because by this time the Romanian mass privatization process had re-
sulted in an even more dispersed ownership structure than general voucher privatizations in 
other countries in CEE (Telegdy, 2002). Stelzer-O’Neill (2000) emphasizes this statement 
by mentioning that by the year of 2000 Romania had the largest stock book in the world, 
though, trade volume was rather low. Therefore, between 1997 and 2001 a considerable 
number of enterprises became owned by outsiders, due to accelerated case-by-case sales of 
shares in those companies. Foreign investors started to acquire stakes in enterprises of the 
financial, energy, industrial or telecommunications sector (e.g. Banca Romana by Societe 
Generale in 1998 or Automobile Dacia by Renault in 1999). The development of foreign 
investments in Romanian companies is illustrated below. 
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Figure 8: Foreign Investment in Privatized Companies, USD million 
Source: Sigma Bleyzer (2003) 
 
 
Reasons for the increased interest of foreign investors were the efficient collaboration of 
the Romanian government with the IMF and the World Bank, the good progress in the es-
tablishment of a developed stock exchange and country’s efforts to join the EU as soon as 
possible. Apart from this, the introduction of a Corporate Governance Code had created a 
positive response from the public, despite evident difficulties in the enforcement of an effi-
cient corporate governance system.  
 
Indeed, Earle and Telegdy (2002) provide evidence that privatization in Romania has been 
surprisingly successful for all firms that have been privatized, regardless of the privatiza-
tion method. Their estimated regression coefficients point to positive and substantial ef-
fects on labor productivity growth, with outside blockholders being the most effective 
owners and dispersed outside owners (participants in mass privatization) and insiders (par-
ticipants in MEBOs) being the least effective, though, statistically significantly positive 
relative to state ownership. 
 
Despite a good economic progress in recent years, a lot of work has to be done to catch up 
with most of the other EU-partners. Still, about 20 percent of Romania’s GDP accrue from 
the public sector. Though, the government acts very considered in privatizing the remain-
ing enterprises. Since millennium the market capitalization of the Bucharest Stock Ex-
change has centupled and the standard of living of Romania’s population, as measured by 
per capita GDP on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) has tripled. Though, Roma-
nia currently ranks 65th according to per capita GDP as measured by PPP. 
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3.3 Privatization and Corporate Governance in Slovenia 
 
3.3.1 Corporate Governance Issues during Slovenian Privatization 
 
As one of the youngest European nations, Slovenia’s corporate governance system is rela-
tively new and had to develop rapidly in order to comply with Western European stan-
dards. Though, the Slovenian government managed to set up an efficient regulatory 
framework, despite little experience within the field of corporate governance.  
 
Facing the challenge to implement a free market economy, the Parliament of Slovenia 
adopted the Law on Commercial Companies (LCC) in May 1993, which was modelled on 
the German “Aktiengesetz”. Thus, the Slovenian corporate governance system includes 
many regulations of Austrian or German governance, such as a mandatory two-tier board 
structure with employee participation for larger corporations, or disclosure obligations of 
significant shareholdings exceeding predefined percentage stakes.  
 
Prior to transition, all Slovenian enterprises were socially (not state) owned, following a 
self-management, decentralized, non-ownership system of corporate governance, with ex-
ecutive managers responsible for the company’s day-to-day operations and worker’s coun-
cils acting as a controlling body (Bohinc and Bainbrige, 2001). This concept had been re-
placed in the early 1990s with the introduction of property-rights based regulations for 
business organizations. The new Economic and Labor Relations Code defined four differ-
ent types of ownership – social, co-operative, mixed and private – however, the decentrali-
zation in the decision-making of public enterprises regarding privatization and restructur-
ing had been retained unchanged.  
 
In contrast to the formerly mentioned countries Bulgaria and Romania, among the political 
parties in Slovenia there existed a clear consensus regarding the importance of transition 
into a market economy in order to ensure economic stability and competitiveness for the 
national economy. A moderate unemployment rate between 5 percent and 9 percent and 
the country‘s low public debt contributed to the fact, that the government’s steps towards 
free markets obtained great acceptance among Slovenia’s two million residents (FiFo Ost, 
2002). Though, the country experienced, similar to its neighbours in CEE, administrative 
and bureaucratic problems in advancing the transition process. 
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The introduction of a two-tier system of governance with a management and a supervisory 
board emphasize the similarity of the LCC’s regulations to the German “Aktiengesetz”. 
The supervisory board’s main responsibilities are within the appointing, monitoring and 
removing of the management board’s members and the reporting to the company’s share-
holders (Cvelbar and Mihalic, 2007). Employee participation within the supervisory boards 
is a mandatory norm for larger enterprises. 
 
Compared to other countries in CEE, Slovenia exhibits a relatively low concentration of 
ownership due to a well-developed regulatory framework with regard to corporate govern-
ance and especially minority shareholder protection. Correspondingly, the country was one 
of the first nations in CEE to create a regulated stock exchange in 1989. After it became 
independent in 1991, as a result of the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, the country had 
been regarded as the most prosperous transition economy in CEE with the highest per cap-
ita GDP among all of the prospective EU-candidates. Apart from that, the country experi-
enced a relatively “mild” communism without excessive centralization. Slovenia’s aston-
ishing economic progress is reflected in the country’s accession into the European Mone-
tary Union as the first nation in CEE in January 2007, and the presidency in the Council of 
the European Union within the first half of 2008. Slovenia is definitely a role model among 
the post-communist countries in CEE and there is much the country can offer to other tran-
sition economies.  
 
3.3.2 The Slovenian Privatization Process 
 
The Slovenian privatization process had been based on a combination of cash and voucher 
privatization (Simoneti and Gregoric, 2004). Because of the country’s unique ownership 
structure of public enterprises – ownership by everybody and nobody, and not by the state - 
privatization in Slovenia had slowly gained momentum, since the state could not force 
managers into privatization. Therefore, the Slovenian government introduced the Slove-
nian Law on Transformation in 1992 and the formerly mentioned Economic and Labor 
Relations Code to promote private ownership. Besides, a Privatization Agency was estab-
lished to oversee the privatization of socially owned property. 
 
The socially owned enterprises were privatized through a combination of partial (free) dis-
tribution of shares (vouchers) to insiders, partial allocation of shares to state funds and par-
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tial sale to the general public. The allocation of 10 percent of the companies’ shares to the 
Pension Fund, 10 percent to the Restitution Fund (both state-controlled funds), 20 percent 
to the Development Fund for further sale to Privatization Investment Funds and 20 percent 
to employees was regulated by the Law on Transformation. The remaining 40 percent of 
the socially owned enterprises were privatized through three distinct mechanisms (Bohinc 
and Bainbridge, 2001) – public tenders, employee buyouts or management buyouts (see 
Figure 9).  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Distinct Mechanisms during Slovenian Privatization 
Source: Bohinc and Bainbridge (2001) 
 
 
The managers of each social enterprise decided on the most appropriate privatization 
method for their firm, however, the Privatization Agency had to approve the management’s 
decision. The majority of the privatized enterprises opted for insider privatization, espe-
cially among most of the smaller companies. Larger corporations had been dominated by 
institutional investors and outside minority investors. Hence, Slovenian Privatization cre-
ated two large owner categories – insider ownership, such as employees, managers, former 
employees and relatives of those persons, and outside ownership in form of Pension, Resti-
tution and Privatization Investment Funds (Simoneti and Gregoric, 2004).  
 
Despite initial protests from the European Council in Brussels, Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDIs) have somehow been excluded from privatization. Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) 
report a 0.33 percent stake of FDIs in all privatized companies by 2000. Instead Slovenia 
opted for privatizing nationally, heavy restructuring and training of domestic qualified per-
sonnel in order to develop and strengthen its national industry (Bauer, 2004 and Kalman, 
Pension Fund (10%)
 
Socially Owned  
Enterprise 
 
Privatization  
Investement Fund 
Public Sale/Employee 
Buyout/Management Buy-
out (40%)
Restitution Fund (10%)
Development Fund (20%)
Employees (20%)
47 
2005). Slovenia’s privatization was based on the concept of “economic nationalism”. 
Overhasty sales of the country’s large enterprises had been largely avoided. Contrary to 
other transition economies in CEE, Slovenia did not rely on FDIs by as much as its 
neighbour countries, due to the country’s low public debt. Thus, Slovenia was able to 
avoid bargain investments by multinational companies, which bring along the threat of 
shifting production sites from one country to another rather quickly. Still, FDI in Slovenia 
is among the lowest in the EU on a per capita basis. The most important foreign investors 
are from Austria and Germany.  
 
Due to Slovenia’s slow but well considered privatization process, state ownership is con-
siderably above most of the other transition economies in CEE (Bauer, 2004). By 2004, 
nearly half of the Slovenian economy had been controlled directly or indirectly via state 
funds by the government (Bauer, 2004). However, since many Slovenian researchers pro-
vided evidence, that companies with a higher private share ownership perform better than 
their state owned counterparts, the government speeded up the gradual sell-off of owner-
ship controlled by state owned funds (Cvelbar and Mihalic, 2007). Restrictions on foreign 
trade via the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (LSE) had been removed. In 2007 the LSE’s mar-
ket capitalization increased by 71.5 percent, and thus, was one of the best performing stock 
markets in Europe. 
 
Overall, the Slovenian transition process can be regarded as successful and efficient. Rea-
sons have been outlined in the two previous chapters – better economic and political pre-
conditions, a strong development of a national industry, homogeneity among politicians 
and residents regarding transition, the gradual and not overhasty privatization process, the 
country’s favorable geographical position and the relatively high educational background 
among the country’s population. 
 
3.4 Comparing the Transition Process in Bulgaria, Romania and Slove-
nia – The “Great Divide” 
 
Since the governments of the presented transition economies had adopted different strate-
gies towards free market economies, it is obvious that the overall results of transition were 
likely to diverge too.  
 
48 
Berglof and Bolton (2002) evaluate the transition process of countries in CEE and point 
out, that economic development in some transition countries, such as Slovenia, has taken 
off, whereas others, such as Bulgaria or Romania, were facing institutional backwardness 
and economic instability. The authors describe this economic gap as the “Great Divide”, 
which is a consequence of the differences in the fiscal and monetary discipline of the re-
spective governments. Lack of fiscal discipline had been associated with the lack of com-
mitment to close down unproductive companies, poor enforcement of property rights and 
low levels of compliance with regulations. Bulgaria and Romania, two countries on the 
wrong side of the Great Divide, had lacked an efficient financial development, where ex-
cessive lending reduced the incentive to undertake absolutely essential restructuring and 
eliminated any budget constraint. 
 
Another reason that explains the Great Divide is the difference in the initial economic posi-
tion before transition took place. Whereas Bulgaria and Romania suffered from centralized 
communism and an enormous public deficit, Slovenia enjoyed low levels of public debt 
after its independence, and a relatively modest and decentralized form of communism. 
Therefore, Slovenia could afford to undertake heavy restructuring and develop a strong 
domestic industry. On the other hand, Bulgaria and Romania, and many other transition 
countries in CEE, introduced mass privatization schemes and attracted crowds of foreign, 
multinational companies with tax exemptions, subsidies, low wages or low energy costs to 
reduce their public deficits.  These companies now tend to shift their factories to even 
cheaper countries, such as Ukraine or China, as a result of increasing real wages in Bul-
garia or Romania (Kalman, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, Slovenia benefits considerably from trade with rich nations located close to 
the domestic market, such as Austria, Italy or Germany. Besides, restructuring appears to 
be more attractive in countries, located close to economies with rich populations (Berglof 
and Bolton, 2002). Thus, Slovenia has a clear competitive advantage over Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
 
Finally, the European Union played an important role regarding the economic development 
of transition countries. An efficient corporate governance system had been regarded as a 
necessary requirement for membership in the European Union. Thus, this created pressure 
to adopt and enforce laws and regulations to establish a basic corporate governance infra-
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structure. Slovenia joined the EU three years before Bulgaria and Romania, which gained 
accession in 2007. Besides, Slovenia is a member of the European Monetary Union, and 
thus, has the advantage of a strong and stable currency contrary to the Bulgarian Leva or 
the Romanian Leu.  
 
However, Bulgaria and Romania have made enormous progress during the last years, and 
the course is set for these economies to follow in Slovenia’s footsteps in the foreseeable 
future. 
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4 Transition in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia – An Empiri-
cal Analysis of the 50 Largest Companies in the Respective 
Countries 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter illustrates the most important results of my empirical study on the 
impact of the transition process on each of the 50 largest companies in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovenia. 
 
Within my study I focus on the development of ownership structures during the privatiza-
tion process in the respective countries. For this purpose, I gathered information regarding 
the ownership structure of the analyzed companies in two periods of time – the initial years 
of the transition process and the years after privatization has basically been completed. For 
Bulgaria and Romania these periods include the years 1995/96 and 2002/03 respectively. 
Though, a few observations are from 1997 for the first period and 2001 or 2004 for the 
second period. This should not bias the results of this study, since ownership structures are 
relatively stable, at least in the short run (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). 
Since Slovenia gained independence relatively late in 1991 and information on the first 
years after independence are rather vague, the first observed period ranges from 1998 to 
1999 and the second period from 2003 to 2004. The companies to be analyzed were deter-
mined by the size of their total assets within the first period of observation. 
 
The main objective of this empirical study is to illustrate significant differences in the out-
comes of privatization, and to test whether the mentioned statements in the theoretical part 
of this paper are also valid for the largest enterprises in the very countries. 
 
4.2 The Data 
 
The database AMADEUS provided the principal basis for my empirical study. Besides, I 
used the internet to search for annual reports, articles and other related information of the 
respective companies, in order to gather missing data and to control for the accuracy of the 
information. 
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Afterwards, I used the software package Microsoft Office Excel for the statistical analysis 
of the gathered data, and created meaningful figures and tables, which highlight the most 
important results of my empirical analysis.  
 
Altogether, the study comprises 291 observations for 150 companies in two time periods, 
with 15 defined variables on whose basis the results are presented.  
 
4.2.1 Explanation of Variables 
 
This chapter provides a brief explanation of the most important variables within my em-
pirical study. As already mentioned, I primarily deal with the development of ownership 
structures for each of the 50 largest enterprises in the three countries Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovenia. Thus, the following figure illustrates some of those variables, which I am 
going to focus on, in a demonstrative manner:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Automobile Dacia S.A. is a Romanian car manufacturer, which is now a subsidiary of the 
French car producer Renault. According to the value of its total assets in 1995/96, Auto-
mobile Dacia S.A. ranks fourth among the largest Romanian enterprises. In 2001, the sec-
ond observation period, Renault had a stake of 93 percent in the Romanian enterprise. 
Thus, Renault is the largest direct shareholder of Automobile Dacia S.A. and located on 
the first pyramid layer. Since Renault is again controlled by the State of France with its 
Figure 10: Ownership Structure of Automobile Dacia S.A. in 2001 
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43.80 percent ownership, Dacia S.A. is part of a pyramidal ownership structure. The State 
of France, located on the second pyramid layer, is basically owned by the whole French 
population, and therefore, represents the largest ultimate owner of Automobile Dacia S.A. 
The variable cash flow rights of ultimate shareholder with a value of 40.73 percent, indi-
cates the ownership rights of the State of France in the Romanian car manufacturer. This 
value is calculated by multiplying the stakes of the largest direct shareholders within the 
corporate pyramid (in our example 93.00 percent and 43.80 percent). As a consequence, 
the State of France was able to control 93 percent of Dacia’s votes with only 40 percent of 
its capital. Although this example is rather straightforward, it is demonstrative for all 150 
observed companies within this empirical work.  
 
Basically the observed variables are categorized regarding the first layer, the ultimate layer 
and the number of pyramid layers within the ownership structure: 
 
First layer variables comprise the stake of the largest direct shareholder (shareholder di-
rect), the type of the largest direct shareholder (shareholder type, e.g. bank, family, free 
float, holding, industrial company, other financial institution, privatization fund or state) 
and the nationality of the largest direct shareholder (shareholder country). I focus only on 
shareholders with a controlling stake of at least 10 percent, which corresponds to the study 
of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999). If there is no shareholder with a stake 
of more than 10 percent, I assume that the company is totally in free float. 
 
Ultimate layer variables include the type and nationality of the largest ultimate shareholder 
(ultimate shareholder type and ultimate shareholder country), the cash flow rights of the 
largest ultimate shareholder, as described in Figure 10 (cash flow rights ultimate share-
holder) and a binary variable (change ultimate shareholder), indicating if a change in the 
type of the ultimate shareholder has occurred from the first to the second period. Besides, I 
calculated the cash flow per voting rights ratio, which is calculated by dividing the ulti-
mate shareholder’s cash flow rights (cash flow rights ultimate shareholder) by the voting 
rights of the largest direct shareholder (shareholder direct). This ratio is regarded as a good 
measure of the degree of separation between an ultimate shareholder’s financial stake and 
its actual controlling stake in a company (Francis, Schipper and Vincent, 2003). In the ex-
ample of Automobile Dacia S.A., illustrated above, the cash flow per voting rights ratio 
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has a value of 0.44 (40.73 percent divided by 93 percent). A ratio of one would indicate 
that the cash flow and voting rights are perfectly aligned. 
 
The number of pyramid layers (number of pyramid layers) indicates the depth or complex-
ity of the pyramidal structure. The larger the number of layers within a pyramid, the more 
likely it is, that there is a great divergence between cash flow and voting rights.  
 
I deliberately disregarded the impact of any deviation from a one-share one-vote scheme, 
since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) give evidence, that the magnitude of 
shares with differential voting rights tends to be rather small, even for countries with poor 
protection of minority shareholders. Besides, a study comprising all deviations from one-
share one-vote is practically not feasible because disclosure is so limited (see chapter 5.2.5 
Limitations of the Empirical Analysis). 
 
4.2.2 First Layer Variables 
 
As stated above, first layer variables define the characteristics of the largest direct share-
holder and its influence on the observed company. The variable shareholder direct meas-
ures the ownership right of the largest direct shareholder on the first layer: 
 
Variable: Shareholder Direct 
Period 1 Period 2   
Observations Mean Median Observations Mean Median 
Bulgaria 50 83.98% 100.00% 48 77.06% 79.50% 
Romania 50 63.20% 70.00% 48 60.15% 63.60% 
Slovenia 50 57.57% 53.50% 45 55.62% 51.00% 
       
Total 150 68.22% 70.00% 141 64.46% 67.00% 
 
Table 4: Cash Flow Rights of Largest Direct Shareholders 
 
 
Direct shareholdings in the 50 largest Slovenian enterprises are considerably lower than 
those in Bulgarian and Romanian companies. Though, all countries show a tendency to-
wards an increasing dispersion of ownership, whereas this tendency is the least in Slove-
nia, due to its already existing low levels of ownership concentration in the country’s larg-
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est companies. This is partly due to the fact, that Slovenia experienced a relatively “mild” 
and decentralized form of communism and had already developed a comprehensive regula-
tory framework with regard to corporate governance.  
 
Bulgaria, the country with the weakest regulations regarding corporate governance, espe-
cially minority shareholder protection, shows the most concentrated ownership structure. 
This corresponds to the findings of many scholars, that ownership concentration is a substi-
tute for poor shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1998).  Besides, Bulgaria’s first steps 
towards privatizing the state’s large enterprises were taken many years after Romania 
started to sell its strategic companies. Another explanation for the huge gap in the level of 
ownership concentration between Bulgaria and Romania is the low popularity of Roma-
nia’s privatization funds, leading to an even more dispersed ownership than expected, since 
those funds were not able to accumulate significant blocks of shares (see chapter 4.2.2 The 
Romanian Privatization Process). 
 
The next table illustrates the shareholder types of the largest direct shareholders in the ob-
served enterprises:  
 
 Variable: Shareholder Type 
 Period 1 
 Bank Holding Family Freefloat Industrial Company
Other 
Financial 
Institution
Privatization 
Fund State 
Bulgaria 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.00% 0.00% 2.00% 82.00% 
Romania 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 4.00% 14.00% 0.00% 74.00% 4.00% 
Slovenia 6.00% 0.00% 18.00% 0.00% 24.00% 2.00% 34.00% 16.00% 
Average 2.00% 1.33% 7.33% 1.33% 16.67% 0.67% 36.67% 34.00% 
         
 Period 2 
 Bank Holding Family Freefloat Industrial Company
Other 
Financial 
Institution
Privatization 
Fund State 
Bulgaria 0.00% 18.75% 0.00% 2.08% 56.25% 2.08% 0.00% 20.83% 
Romania 0.00% 16.67% 2.08% 6.25% 54.17% 0.00% 18.75% 2.08% 
Slovenia 6.67% 8.89% 8.89% 0.00% 40.00% 0.00% 28.89% 6.67% 
Average 2.22% 14.77% 3.66% 2.78% 50.14% 0.69% 15.88% 9.86% 
 
Table 5: Types of Largest Direct Shareholders 
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It is quite striking to note that bank ownership or controlling stakes by other financial insti-
tutions are practically nonexistent during both of the two periods in Bulgaria and Romania. 
This can be explained by the troubled financial situation of many domestic banks. As a 
consequence, bank ownership had developed rather slowly, since the financial sector had 
to consolidate at first and implement a market-based banking system (see Chapter 3.4.1. 
Challenges during Privatization in Transition Economies in Central and Eastern Europe). 
 
The impact of state ownership, being it directly or indirectly via privatization funds, de-
creased considerably in favor of industrial companies and holdings. The latter may also be 
categorized as “miscellaneous” because holdings may be owned by many of the other 
ownership types. Since only a minority of these institutions disclose their ownership struc-
ture, holdings are shown separately. The increased impact of private ownership is illus-
trated in the following figure: 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Development of Private Ownership 
 
 
Whereas the impact of private ownership on the 50 largest companies has increased con-
siderably to nearly 80 percent in Bulgaria and Romania, privatization of Slovenia’s largest 
enterprises had been rather slow-going. This is consistent with the theoretical part of this 
paper on the Slovenian privatization process, where I explain that the Slovenian govern-
ment preferred to build up a strong national industry and carry out intensive restructuring 
instead of divesting public companies by means of mass privatization. Thus, the Slovenian 
state’s influence on its largest companies is considerably above the impact of its Bulgarian 
or Romanian counterparts on the largest enterprises in the respective countries. 
16.00% 
79.17% 79.17%
22.00%
50.00% 
64.44% 
0.00% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
30.00% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
70.00% 
80.00% 
90.00% 
Bulgaria Romania Slovenia 
Period 1 Period 2
56 
 Variable: Shareholder Country  
 Bulgaria Romania Slovenia  
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Total 
Domestic 45 32 46 23 39 34 219 
Austria 0 2 1 2 2 2 9 
Belgium 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Cyprus 0 2 0 1 0 0 3 
Czech         
Republic 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
France 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 
Germany 2 3 1 4 2 1 13 
Greece 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
Italy 0 1 0 0 2 1 4 
Netherlands 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 
Switzerland 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 
USA 1 3 0 3 0 0 7 
Others 0 2 1 5 2 2 12 
Total 50 48 50 48 50 45 291 
 
Table 6: Frequencies of Nationalities of Largest Direct Shareholders 
 
 
The previous table (see Table 6) confirms the increasing participation of foreign investors 
in the Bulgarian and Romanian privatization process. Regarding Slovenia, domestic own-
ership has remained the dominant form of ownership. Again, this corresponds to the fact, 
that Slovenia initially preferred domestic over foreign ownership in order to strengthen the 
national industry.  
 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the US are the most prevalent foreign shareholders 
in the observed countries, however, the US does not play a major role in the ownership of 
the 50 largest Slovenian enterprises. The following figure compares the share of foreign 
ownership in the 50 largest companies in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia: 
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Figure 12: Share of Foreign Direct Ownership 
 
 
Figure 12 indicates that the majority of Slovenia’s largest enterprises is still controlled by 
domestic owners (families, industrial companies and the state), whereas foreign ownership 
has increased significantly in Bulgaria and Romania. Though, Romania’s largest compa-
nies seem to be more attractive to foreign investors than Bulgarian enterprises (possible 
reasons are stated in the chapter 4.2 “Privatization and Corporate Governance in Roma-
nia”). 
 
4.2.3 Ultimate Layer Variables 
 
This chapter highlights the results of my empirical study on the ultimate layer of the own-
ership structure of the 50 largest companies in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. 
 
The variable cash flow rights ultimate shareholder, explained in figure 10, measures the 
impact of the largest ultimate shareholder on the analyzed companies. The results are 
summarized in the following table: 
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Variable: Cash Flow Rights Ultimate Shareholder 
Period 1 Period 2   
Observations Mean Median Observations Mean Median 
Bulgaria 50 82.91% 100.00% 48 59.25% 61.20% 
Romania 50 60.41% 70.00% 48 41.63% 40.36% 
Slovenia 50 53.51% 53.50% 45 42.71% 33.44% 
       
Total 150 65.61% 70.00% 141 47.97% 50.87% 
 
Table 7: Cash Flow Rights of Largest Ultimate Shareholders 
 
 
Similar to the variable shareholder direct the development of the ultimate shareholders’ 
cash flow rights from the first to the second period shows a tendency towards ownership 
dispersion. However, the influence of the largest ultimate owners on the observed compa-
nies is still rather strong, which is a common result of the emergence of corporate pyra-
mids, which until now dominate the picture of corporate ownership in Continental Europe 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).  
 
The divergence between the cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholders and those 
of the largest direct shareholders, as measured by the cash flow per voting rights ratio, is 
significantly larger in the second period of my observations (see Table 8):  
 
Variable: Cash Flow per Voting Rights Ratio 
Period 1 Period 2   
Observations Mean Median Observations Mean Median 
Bulgaria 50 0.99 1.00 48 0.77 0.77 
Romania 50 0.96 1.00 48 0.69 0.63 
Slovenia 50 0.93 0.94 45 0.77 0.66 
       
Total 150 0.96 1.00 141 0.74 0.76 
 
Table 8: Cash Flow per Voting Rights Ratio 
 
 
The decreasing value of the cash flow per voting rights ratio is partly due to the increasing 
number of pyramid layers in the second period, which is illustrated later in this chapter. 
 
59 
Table 9 shows the types of owners on the ultimate layer of the observed companies. Re-
garding Bulgaria and Romania, the table demonstrates similar developments to those on 
the first layer of the ownership structure – a decreasing influence of the domestic state on 
the companies in favor of industrial companies. Besides, foreign states have gained signifi-
cant stakes in Romania, and the impact of individuals or families on the ultimate layer is 
much stronger than on the first layer, since enterprises are usually controlled by the latter 
ownership type. Financials take a rather unimportant position in the ownership of the coun-
tries’ largest enterprises. 
 
Again, Slovenia represents the opposite with even increasing cash flow rights of the Slove-
nian state. The results point to a strong influence of the Slovenian state on many of the 
country’s enterprises. The government controls the majority of the country’s largest com-
panies, if not as a direct shareholder, then on the ultimate layer via corporate pyramids. 
 
 Variable: Ultimate Shareholder Type 
 Period 1 
 Bank Holding Family Foreign State Freefloat
Industrial 
Company 
Other  
Financial 
Institution 
State 
Bulgaria 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 86.00% 
Romania 0.00% 0.00% 8.00% 2.00% 4.00% 8.00% 0.00% 78.00% 
Slovenia 4.00% 2.00% 22.00% 6.00% 0.00% 12.00% 4.00% 50.00% 
Average 1.33% 0.67% 11.33% 2.67% 1.33% 10.00% 1.33% 71.33% 
         
 Period 2 
 Bank Holding Family Foreign State Freefloat
Industrial 
Company 
Other 
Financial 
Institution 
State 
Bulgaria 0.00% 12.50% 31.25% 0.00% 2.08% 33.33% 0.00% 20.83% 
Romania 0.00% 4.17% 35.42% 10.42% 6.25% 16.67% 6.25% 20.83% 
Slovenia 6.67% 6.67% 15.56% 4.44% 2.22% 8.89% 2.22% 53.33% 
Average 2.22% 7.78% 27.41% 4.95% 3.52% 19.63% 2.82% 31.66% 
 
Table 9: Types of Largest Ultimate Shareholders 
 
 
The results presented in table 9 are again highlighted graphically in the following figure 
(see Figure 13). Striking is the even decreasing share of private control on the ultimate 
layer in Slovenia, whereas the impact of private ultimate shareholders has jumped consid-
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erably in Bulgaria and Romania. The results of Slovenia correspond to the findings of 
Bauer (2004), mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper, that half of the Slovenian 
economy had been controlled directly or indirectly by the State. According to the results of 
this study, Slovenia’s 50 largest enterprises do not present an exception.  
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Figure 13: Share of Private Ultimate Ownership 
 
 
Table 10 presents the results of the variable ultimate shareholder country, which illustrates 
the nationalities of the largest ultimate shareholders. Similar to the findings on the first 
layer, the results show a tendency towards increased foreign ownership. Again, Austria, 
Germany and the US play a considerable role within the ownership structure of the coun-
tries’ largest enterprises. Besides, Russia and the UK hold significant cash flow rights on 
the ultimate layer, whereas they have virtually no direct shareholdings in the observed 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 Variable: Ultimate Shareholder Country  
 Bulgaria Romania Slovenia  
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Total 
Domestic 45 27 44 18 38 32 204 
Austria 0 1 1 4 2 3 11 
Belgium 2 2 0 0 1 1 6 
Cyprus 0 2 0 1 0 0 3 
Czech Re-
public 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
France 0 1 1 2 1 2 7 
Germany 2 4 1 3 2 1 13 
Greece 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Italy 0 2 0 1 2 1 6 
Russia 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 
Netherlands 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Switzerland 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 
United King-
dom 0 1 1 4 0 1 7 
USA 1 3 0 3 1 1 9 
Others 0 4 1 5 1 1 12 
Total 50 48 50 48 50 45 291 
 
Table 10: Frequencies of Nationalities of Largest Ultimate Shareholders 
 
 
The increasing role of foreign investors is again emphasized in the following figure (see 
Figure 14). The low percentage of foreign ultimate shareholdings in Slovenia indicates that 
generally ownership remains within national boundaries, even across corporate pyramids. 
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Figure 14: Share of Foreign Ultimate Shareholdings 
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The last variable regarding the ultimate layer within the ownership structure is the variable 
change ultimate shareholder. It indicates the percentage of companies which experienced a 
change in the type of the ultimate shareholder. Among the 141 companies, where data for 
both periods were available, about two thirds of the Bulgarian and Romanian companies 
had a change in the type of the ultimate shareholder, whereas the ultimate owner of only 
one third of the Slovenian enterprises has changed from one period to the other. This gap is 
again a result of the different strategies, the governments have implemented, towards the 
implementation of a free market economy. 
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Figure 15: Change in Type of Ultimate Shareholder 
 
 
4.2.4 Number of Pyramid Layers 
 
As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the number of pyramid layers is an 
important variable, which indicates the depth or complexity of a company’s ownership 
structure. The larger the number of layers within a corporate pyramid, the longer is the 
controlling or monitoring path of the ultimate owner. However, corporate pyramids enable 
ultimate shareholders to greatly enhance their control rights in excess of their cash flow 
rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). 
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 Variable: Number of Pyramid Layers 
 Bulgaria Romania Slovenia 
No. of Layers Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 
1 90.00% 50.00% 24.00% 25.00% 50.00% 26.67% 
2 10.00% 31.25% 72.00% 37.50% 44.00% 55.56% 
3 0.00% 12.50% 2.00% 29.17% 6.00% 17.78% 
4 0.00% 6.25% 0.00% 6.25% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 2.00% 2.08% 0.00% 0.00% 
       
Average 1.10 1.75 1.84 2.23 1.56 1.91 
 
Table 11: Number of Pyramid Layers 
 
 
In all the three countries the companies experienced a strong enlargement of corporate 
pyramids, which is obtained through an increase of the number of pyramid layers. This 
tendency is reflected by the strong decline of companies in Bulgaria and Slovenia with an 
ultimate owner on the first layer of the ownership structure. However, those results may be 
biased by the fact, that some countries have implemented privatization funds to a larger 
degree than others (e.g. Romania). 
 
Though, the results show a larger complexity of corporate pyramids and a tendency to-
wards an enhancement of the ultimate shareholders’ control rights in excess of their cash 
flow rights. 
 
4.2.5 Limitations of the Empirical Analysis 
 
During the process of gathering information on the 150 companies I faced many obstacles 
in connection with a lack of data availability. Some enterprises within the sample changed 
their names, were part of mergers or acquisitions, changed their field of operations or sim-
ply went bankrupt from one period to the other. Besides, limited regulations regarding dis-
closure of company related information complicated the process of information gathering. 
As a consequence, I was not able to collect adequate information on nine companies for the 
second observation period. Thus, my study is based on 291 observations for 150 compa-
nies, whereas only 141 firms provide data for both periods. 
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I used the database AMADEUS as my principal source of information, however, some 
information, such as the type of the largest direct or ultimate shareholder, were rather un-
clear (e.g. in the case of an involved holding company). Thus, I used the internet to search 
for annual reports, newspaper articles and other company related information to control for 
the accuracy of the data provided by AMADEUS. Furthermore, I directly contacted the 
companies in the case of information discrepancies. Unfortunately, the latter method – di-
rect contact with the companies – provided only limited success, due to a very low re-
sponse rate. 
 
During the data evaluation I did not consider any deviation from a one-share one-vote 
scheme since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) provide evidence that the 
magnitude of preferential shares is rather small and does not bias the results. However, 
their study did not include countries in CEE and one should be cautious in interpreting 
their findings. 
 
Another limitation of this study is the time scale of the analysis, ranging from 1995 to 2003 
in Bulgaria and Romania, and from 1997 to 2004 in Slovenia. Thus, the study does not 
perfectly reflect today’s outcomes of privatization, since some more companies have been 
privatized after the second observation period, especially in Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
 
Nonetheless, I was doing my best to conduct a useful empirical study comprising a repre-
sentative sample within a period of time, which I regard as the most characteristic years of 
privatization in the observed countries.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
During the 1990s corporate governance in Central and Eastern Europe experienced wide-
spread amendments due to the countries’ transition from a command to a market economy. 
Whereas corporate governance regulations were practically nonexistent before the imple-
mentation of free markets in those countries, many nations can nowadays boast with higher 
levels of investor rights protection than some of their Western European counterparts. 
However, most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are facing severe difficulties 
in the implementation of effective law enforcement, and thus, are adversely affected by 
corruption and bribery. Due to many internal and external obstacles, the overall transition 
process was a complicated and initially unexpectedly slow-going process. 
 
The principal element of transition – privatization of state owned enterprises – has seen 
many different characteristics with regard to the speed of the privatization program, the 
privatization method or the openness towards foreign investors. As a result, the economic 
outcome of privatization across the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe was 
far from homogenous. Whereas some countries managed to overcome the problems a sud-
den transition towards free markets entails, rather successful, others were facing institu-
tional backwardness and macroeconomic instability. Besides, ownership structures of pri-
vatized companies have changed considerably with the participation of private investors. 
Again, the impact of privatization on ownership structures had been rather unequal across 
transition economies regarding the level of ownership concentration and the dominant type 
of the ultimate shareholder. Within my empirical study on the effects of privatization re-
garding ownership rights, on the 50 largest enterprises in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, 
I observe the practical relevance of the comprehensive theoretical background, presented in 
the first part of this thesis, for this group of companies. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis highlight the developments of ownership in the three 
observed countries – a decreasing level of public ownership, an increasing participation of 
foreign investors and the emergence of corporate pyramids. Furthermore, the inconsistency 
in the development of ownership rights, as a result of the different privatization strategies, 
is illustrated in meaningful figures and tables and provides evidence, that the countries’ 
largest enterprises provide a representative sample and do not represent an exception. 
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Im Rahmen meiner Diplomarbeit erläutere ich die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance 
in Mittel- und Osteuropa während des Transformationsprozesses zur freien Marktwirt-
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Kapiteln 1 bis 3, andererseits in eine empirische Studie, welche die praktische Relevanz 
des erstgenannten Teils verdeutlichen soll.  
 
Basierend auf bereits vorhandener, einschlägiger Literatur behandelt Kapitel 1 die wesent-
lichen Merkmale der Corporate Governance. Kapitel 2 beschreibt den Prozess der Privati-
sierung in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Nach einem Review der weltweit wichtigsten histori-
schen Aspekte der Privatisierung werden die Gründe und Ziele einer Transformation zur 
Marktwirtschaft erklärt. Das Kapitel wird durch eine Beleuchtung der unterschiedlichen 
Privatisierungsstrategien, die in Mittel- und Osteuropa verfolgt wurden, sowie einer Be-
schreibung der größten Herausforderungen, mit denen die Regierungen konfrontiert waren, 
vervollständigt. Kapitel 3 erläutert den gesamten Transformationsprozess und die damit 
verbundene Entwicklungen in Bezug auf Corporate Governance in den drei Ländern Bul-
garien, Rumänien und Slowenien. Abschließend erfolgt eine Evaluierung der einzelnen 
Privatisierungsmethoden, die in den analysierten Ländern umgesetzt wurden. 
 
Kapitel 4 umfasst den empirischen Teil dieser Arbeit. Dabei analysiere ich die Auswirkun-
gen der Privatisierung auf die Eigentumsstrukturen der jeweils 50 größten Unternehmen in 
Bulgarien, Rumänien und Slowenien. Die Unternehmen wurden auf Basis ihrer Bilanz-
summen ausgewählt und im Hinblick auf deren Veränderung in den Eigentumsstrukturen 
analysiert. Aussagekräftige Tabellen und Abbildungen werden im Verlauf dieses Kapitels 
illustriert. Dabei werden signifikante Ausprägungen, wie der Rückgang von Staatseigen-
tum, die steigende Bedeutung von internationalen Investoren und die Entstehung von so 
genannten Unternehmenspyramiden verdeutlicht.  
